--- title: "Stop Break" type: "pdf" year: "1999" canonical: "/projects/1022" --- # "STOP BREAK" ![img-0.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-49/img-0.jpeg) # Table of Contents - ["STOP BREAK"](#stop-break) - [Submission for the](#submission-for-the) - [1999 Herman Goldstien Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing](#1999-herman-goldstien-award-for-excellence-in-problem-oriented-policing) - [Abstract](#abstract) - [Scan](#scan) - [Analysis](#analysis) - [Response](#response) - [SUBMISSION](#submission) - [S.A.R.A. PROBLEM SOLVING MODEL](#sara-problem-solving-model) - [Scan](#scan) - [Analysis](#analysis) - [Response](#response) - [Stopbreak Solutions:](#stopbreak-solutions) - [Stopbreak Solutions:](#stopbreak-solutions) - [Stopbreak Solution:](#stopbreak-solution) - [Stopbreak Solution:](#stopbreak-solution) - [What is Stopbreak ?](#what-is-stopbreak) - [Overview...](#overview) - [Stage 1 - Information](#stage-1-information) - [Stage 2 - Crime Prevention Area (CPA)](#stage-2-crime-prevention-area-cpa) - [Stage 3 - Silent Alarm - (Offender detection)](#stage-3-silent-alarm-offender-detection) - [STRATEGIES AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES](#strategies-and-performance-measures) - [Assess](#assess) - [Agency and Officer Information:](#agency-and-officer-information) - [QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE](#queensland-police-service) - [NORTH COAST REGION](#north-coast-region) - [RESEARCH UNIT](#research-unit) - [PROJECT STOPBREAK EVALUATION](#project-stopbreak-evaluation) - [Victim Survey](#victim-survey) - [Identification of Security Audit Recipients](#identification-of-security-audit-recipients) - [Methodology](#methodology) - [Sample](#sample) - [Methodological Considerations](#methodological-considerations) - [OPERATION STOPBREAK SECURITY AUDIT](#operation-stopbreak-security-audit) - [RUNDAMING POLICE](#rundaming-police) - [PRESENT CONDITION](#present-condition) - [Security Doors](#security-doors) - [Doors Exterior (main entry/exit door)](#doors-exterior-main-entryexit-door) - [Sliding Doors/Other Doors](#sliding-doorsother-doors) - [Property](#property) - [Alarms](#alarms) - [Telephone](#telephone) - [Lighting](#lighting) - [Outside](#outside) - [Personal Security and Routines](#personal-security-and-routines) - [Other Advice (e.g. electronic security)](#other-advice-eg-electronic-security) - [Contact Information](#contact-information) - [Contact Information](#contact-information) - [Contact Information](#contact-information) - [Repair Windows](#repair-windows) - [Contact Information](#contact-information) - [Repair Windows](#repair-windows) - [Your Inscription](#your-inscription) - [Your Inscription](#your-inscription) - [CONFIDENTIAL](#confidential) - [CONFIDENTIAL](#confidential) ## Submission for the 1999 Herman Goldstien Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing # 1999 Herman Goldstien Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing ## Abstract "STOPBREAK" ## Scan Research published in January 1996 indicated that the number of residential burglaries per 1000 dwellings recorded in Queensland, Australia had increased by 176 percent over the preceding 20 years. ${ }^{1}$ The financial and emotional toll that this has taken on the community as a whole is enormous. No longer did the people of Queensland feel safe in their homes. ## Analysis Further research concluded that "even if the number of police patrols were doubled, the typical dwelling or business would still only be under surveillance for an average of 60 seconds per day." ${ }^{2}$ These statistics together with others reporting unsatisfactory levels of repeat victimisation and offender apprehension rates ( $12 \%$ clear up ${ }^{3}$ ) supported the need for a new approach to the problem of break and enter. A proposed response was then formulated by considering bilateral strategies in terms of a proactive and reactive community policing partnership endeavour. The result was a project called "Stopbreak" which has now proposed for adoption as a program for the Queensland Police Service statewide. ## Response "Stopbreak" aims to prevent initial and repeat victimisation through the staged implementation of proactive community policing strategies. [^0] [^0]: ${ }^{1}$ Criminal Justice Commision Research Notes on "Residential Break and Enter in Queensland" Queensland Australia (1996) ${ }^{\text {A }}$ New South Wales Bureau of Criminal Statistics (1996) $\cdot$Queensland Police Service Statistical Review (1995) The Stopbreak Program: * supplies information to the community at the time of the break and enter when they are most likely to act upon it. This crime prevention information includes a home security assessment (Stage 1) * implements quickly established "Crime Prevention Areas" (CPA) in break and enter crime hotspots as identified by criminal intelligence review. (Stage 2) * proposes the installation of alarms in buildings or residences which have been identified as having been the subject of repeat break and enter victimisation. (Stage 3) Assess In assessing the results of "Stopbreak" within the North Coast Region, numerous measures including officer surveys and victim surveys were utilised to measure the success or otherwise of the 10 individual strategies associated with Stop break's 3 stages. Positive results from the officer and victim surveys indicated that the program was seen generally as a positive step towards a more professional approach to the offence of break and enter. Victim surveys were especially encouraging indicating that a significant proportion had acted upon the security assessment provided by police. It was also observed from patrol logs that police did not comparatively take longer at the scene of break and enters due to the provision of security information to victims. It is expected that the advent of "Volunteers in Policing" in Queensland will be of considerable benefit to the conduct of the Stopbreak Program especially in Stages One and Two. # SUBMISSION ## S.A.R.A. PROBLEM SOLVING MODEL ## Scan In reviewing research published in January 1996, a Regional Community Policing Co-ordinator in the state of Queensland, Australia observed that the number of residential burglaries per 1000 dwellings recorded in Queensland had increased by 176 percent over the preceding 20 years. 4 In a period of just five years from the financial year 1987/88 to the financial year 1991/92 the annual incidence of break and enters in the state as a whole grew from 1282 to 2130 reported offences per 100,000 population. This represented an increase of $66 \%$ on 1987/88 figures. ${ }^{5}$ The financial and emotional toll that this had taken on the community as a whole was enormous. No longer did the people of Queensland feel safe in their homes. These statistics together with others reporting un-satisfactory levels of repeat victimisation and offender apprehension ( $12 \%$ clear up rate for North Coast Region in 1996 6) convinced this officer that a new approach to the problem of unlawful break and enter was required aside from the traditional approach of increasing police patrols. Previous research had already concluded that "even if the number of police patrols were doubled, the typical dwelling or business would still only be under surveillance for an average of 60 seconds per day." ${ }^{\wedge}$ Other research revealed that services/forces with the greatest percentage of officers engaged in crime prevention work were the forces with the greatest lowering of recorded crime ${ }^{8}$. It was consequently concluded that what was needed was a new proactive, approach to break and enter crime aside from simply increasing police patrols. [^0] [^0]: ^Criminal Justice Commision Research Notes on "Residential Break and Enter in Queensland" Queensland Australia (1996) ^Queensland Police Service Statistical Review 1995/96 (Ten year trend review) ^Queensland Police Service Statistical Review (1995) ${ }^{7}$ New South Wales Bureau of Criminal Statistics (1996) ${ }^{8}$ Grimshaw, Harvey and Pease (1989) # Analysis Break-ins continue to represent one in five of all criminal offences reported to police. But the regularity of these offences belies the fact that break and enters are largely preventable. It could be as simple as an unlocked door or an open window that makes the difference between a thief breaking into your house or choosing an easier target elsewhere. Most house break-ins are crimes of opportunity but by securing your home and being vigilant, a community can make a real difference. In considering alternatives, it was also observed that community strategies such as Neighbourhood Watch often only existed in areas where the population was in a middle to higher socio-economic grouping or in areas with a proportionately older resident population. Historically these are not break and enter "hotspots". During this scanning process the manager of the nominated project had recourse to numerous community groups including Neighbourhood Watch members and Victims of Crime. It was evident during consultations with these groups that more had to be done to better facilitate the operation of police and the community in partnership so as to address the increasing break and enter victimisation rate. It was also established through discussions with executive management that what ever was to be done had to be highly resource efficient and effective due to already high levels of community service demand on limited police resources. Following a criminal intelligence analysis, the following problems were identified as the principle contributing factors to the increasing incidence of break and enter: * a lack of proper security measures making them a prime target. * a lack of community co-ordination which enables persistent break and enter offenders to operate with ease. * stolen goods being easily passed offfor profit due to the lack of identification engraving. These problems were found to be generic across all levels of the community. A further analysis was conducted of current police response strategies. The following observations were made consequent to that analysis * In larger police divisions where break and enters are most frequent, the initial taking of the police report is attended by two police, one of whom has the responsibility of taking offence particulars and report submission * Neighbourhood Watch areas take up to 6 months to establish and are limited in application to larger areas (e.g. approx. 500 homes when a break and enter hotspot could only be limited to a single street. * Current community policing responses lack mobility and proper evaluation making them of questionable effect. Lead up time generally was excessive A proposed response to the problem of the increasing break and enter offences and repeat victimisation was then formulated by considering bilateral strategies in terms of a proactive and reactive community policing partnership endeavour. In formulating such a response, the project manager had regard to the initial availability of a supporting police officer at the scene of a break and enter when a report is being taken and other observations relating to community policing initiatives. The resulting package of strategies was a project called "Stopbreak". # Response From the outset, Stopbreak was conceived as a different holistic strategy seeking a "whole of community approach" to the problems associated with break and enter. Whilst it did involve some established community groups (Neighbourhood Watch Areas), Stopbreak essentially involved individual members of the community, encouraging them towards the undertaking of self help crime prevention strategies and problem solving. The following problems associated with break and enter were therefore to addressed as follows.... Problem 1: Lack of proper security measures in premises making them a prime target # Stopbreak Solutions: (a) Advise victims by way of a written security report of appropriate security measures able to be taken at their premises at a time when victims are most likely to act upon this advice. (b) Educate victims of crime and their nearby neighbours on crime prevention techniques through provision of available crime prevention documentation. Problem 2: Lack of co-ordination of community purpose enabling a persistent break and enter offender to operate with ease and relatively free from fear of apprehension ## Stopbreak Solutions: (a) Co-ordinate neighbourhood co- operation in vigilance against crime through establishment of Crime Prevention areas when necessary. (b) Foster neighbourhood co- operation in the Implementation of crime prevention techniques. (c) Provide participating police with suitable security audit training and easy to use documentation for the provision of associated crime prevention information. (d) Establish Crime Prevention Areas in break and enter "hot spots" with a view to decreasing the incidence of repeat victimisation and the incidence of break and enters generally Problem 3: Property secured by offenders consequent to break and enter offences is easily passed off for profit due to the lack of identification engraving. # Stopbreak Solution: (a) Victims of crime and their neighbours are encouraged to mark their property at a time when they are most likely to heed that advice. In this way they will limit the saleability of their ill got gains thereby lessening their motivation to offend. Problem 4: Lasting psychological and financial effects on victims of crime ## Stopbreak Solution: (a) Address the impact on victims through referral to victim support organisations. ## What is Stopbreak ? ## Overview... Stopbreak's aim is to ${ }^{11}$ prevent initial and repeat victimisation through the staged implementation of proactive community and policing strategies." Project "Stopbreak": - provides the community with information to help them to help themselves; - establishes networks within the community to assist police through the provision of information leading to the apprehension of offenders in their area Whilst the project was conceived in three stages, due to resource restrictions, it was implemented in two stages. ## Stage 1 - Information This first stage commenced on July 1,1996 and included the provision of a security audit and crime prevention information to break and enter victims. During this "security audit" a trained assessor examines the home or premise identifying any means whatsoever which may promote a more secure environment. Information is also presented to the victim on property engraving and identification practises. This service would usually be provided by a police officer, not engaged in the investigative process of the offence. The officer also approaches neighbours to pass-on crime prevention information on break and enter offences and seek information about the substantive offence. The benefit of this approach is that information is provided at a time when the victims and their neighbours are most likely to act upon it. Police in participating Divisions within the North Coast Region were provided with training on how to provide security audits. # Stage 2 - Crime Prevention Area (CPA) Based on criminal intelligence information on break and enter hot spots, this stage is concerned with the establishment of a Crime Prevention Area (CPA) in the area. CPAs are an informal version of Neighbourhood Watch areas conceived to remain active for as long as the offences continue to occur. CPAs are designed as a rapid deployment option for police managers. CPAs are designed to help police catch offenders through people passing on information. It is often the case that offenders are often resident in or near break and enter "hotspots". The community will be encouraged to be vigilant and participate in crime prevention by receiving relevant documentation including security pamphlets and a crime prevention sign (all property engraved etc.,) to be displayed in the area of their residence. Stopbreak also proposed a third stage. Following is a precise of stage 3. # Stage 3 - Silent Alarm - (Offender detection) Based on crime report information and intelligence data, any residences, buildings or establishments which have been the subject of repeat victimisation (especially within designated hotspot areas) will be targeted for the temporary installation of a portable silent alarm system. This alarm system will be linked to the police communication network which will facilitate an immediate police response to an offender activation. (All three stages are being trialed in major QPS Problem Solving Policing Projects underway within the state including the Beenleigh Break and Enter Reduction Project and the Redcliffe City Safe Project) While the primary objective of Project Stopbreak relates to the prevention of repeat victimisation, it is expected that the project will in the longer term have impact on victimisation rates generally. The following table succinctly details Strategies, Performance Measures and the Associated Data Sources utilised during the conduct and evaluation of the project. ## STRATEGIES AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES | Strategies... | Performance Measures | | :--: | :--: | | 1. Advise victims by way of a written security report of appropriate security measures able to be taken at their premises at a time when victims are most likely to act upon this advice. | Victims implementing security measures upon police advice. Measurement Data Source - Victim Survey and follow up. | | 2. Educate victims of crime and their nearby neighbours on crime prevention techniques through provision of available crime prevention documentation. | Level of security awareness raised. Security measures implemented. Measurement Data Source - Victim Survey | | 3. Co-ordinate neighbourhood co- operation in vigilance against crime through establishment of Crime Prevention areas when necessary. | Level of community involvement in Crime prevention area. Offenders apprehended. Measurement Data Sources - Victim Survey, Intelligence Reports. | | 4. Foster neighbourhood co- operation in the implementation of crime prevention techniques. | Victims and neighbours undertaking crime prevention measures. Measurement Data Sources - Victim Survey. | | 5. Address the impact on victims through referral to victim support organisations. | Victims increase utilisation of Support Organisations. Measurement Data Sources - Victim and support organisational survey. | | --- | --- | | 6. Provide participating police with suitable security audit training and easy to use documentation for the provision of associated crime prevention information. | Police perform duties associated with this project in an efficient and effective manner complying with operational guidelines. Measurement Data Sources - Victim Survey. | | 7. Establish Crime Prevention Areas in break and enter "hot spots" with a view to decreasing the incidence of repeat victimisation and the incidence of break and enters generally | Crime prevention areas established Intelligence information provided. Measurement Data Sources - Victim Survey, Intelligence reports. Suspects apprehended subsequent to information provided. | | 8. Implement project without greatly impacting upon time expended at crime scene. | Police attendance time frame at scene not inordinately increased Measurement Data Sources- Officer Patrol Logs & IMS | | 9. Decrease the incidence of break and enter related offences including repeat victimisation through the implementation of project strategies. | Periodic statistical information comparison reveals a decrease in the incidence of B&E generally and repeat victimisation Measurement Data Sources- CRISP DATA | | 10. Utilise electronic silent alarms at locations subject to repeat occurrences of break and enter offences with a view to apprehending repeat offenders. | Offenders apprehended, alarms installed. Measurement Data Sources - District co- ordination team records. (NB not yet implemented) | # Assess This program was initially trialed in 4 police divisions within the North Coast Police Region in the said state for the period of one year under the management of Senior Sergeant Anthony Sinn (program conception design and management) with the overview and support of the Regional Operations Co-ordinator Chief Superintendent Gerry Stevens. In assessing the results of "Stopbreak" within the North Coast Region, external and internal evaluators utilised criminal intelligence data, crime reports, officer survey, patrol logs, and victim surveys to examine designated performance measures assigned to 10 individual strategies associated with the three program stages. Initially, Stopbreak was implemented into areas which did not have an excessive workload due to fears that program strategies in stage one would increase time taken at the offence location. The unfortunate result was that due to insufficient repeat victimisation within the areas trialed, definitive findings were unable to be reached through statistical research. Notwithstanding this, the qualitative results provided by the officer and victim surveys provided positive feedback indicating that the program was generally seen as a substantial step towards a better, more professional approach to the offence of break and enter. Notably, the majority of victims contacted through the course of the evaluation survey ${ }^{9}$ implemented at least one of the security measures proposed by police on the security assessment form (Stage 1). It was also observed that police patrols did not comparatively take longer at the scene of break and enters due to the provision of security information to victims. It is expected that the advent of "Volunteers in Policing" in Queensland will be of considerable benefit to the conduct of the Stopbreak Program especially in Stages One and Two. Further evaluation information is contained in an excerpt of the "Queensland Police Service, North Coast Region Project Stopbreak Evaluation Report" which is appendix "A" attached. # Agency and Officer Information: The North Coast Police Region is situated just north of Brisbane in Queensland. The region incorporates within its boundaries 5 police districts and approx. 805 police officers with support personnel. Stopbreak was a regional project initially incorporating four police divisions within four separate districts. Each of these divisions had a population base of approx. 30,000 to 50,000 . Each police establishment initially associated with the project was managed by a Senior Sergeant of Police. [^0] [^0]: 91998 North Coast Regional Research Unit - Project Stopbreak Evaluation See excerpt appendices "A" The project has now been expanded to program status and is being expanded across the North Coast Region and into many areas across the state of Queensland. The project is currently being refined for adoption as a Queensland Police Service Program. No special training in problem solving was given to the project manager prior to initiation of this project although specialised training was given to police involved in security assessment. Notwithstanding this lack of specialised problem solving training, no specific problems were encountered by the project manager in his own duties. Problems were however encountered in project compliance by general police. It is expected that current marketing of problem solving as a policing endeavour will largely address these issues. Budgetary expense items included .... (1) Security Resource Assessment Package Manufacture (2) Project Training (Travelling allowance for specialised trainers) (3) Project Organisational costs (meetings etc) All of these costs were born by the North Coast Police Region and the Crime Prevention Section, Brisbane. The Stopbreak initiative was designed and implemented without expectation of special incentive other than the expectation of positive results in crime trends and security awareness. The Project Contact Person : Name: Anthony Sinn Rank: Senior Sergeant Position: Regional Community Policing Co-ordinator Address PO Box 552 Maroochydore Phone: 07-54439555 Fax: 07- 544392333 Appendices Appendix "A": Excerpt from Project Stopbreak Evaluation Victim Survey Appendix " B": Stopbreak Security Audit Form Appendix "C": Abstract as presented to the 4th Annual Australian Crime Prevention Conference (focus on Problem Oriented Policing) 1996 Appendix "D" Article from the March Edition of the Queensland Police Vedette 1999 Appendix "E": Graph extract from QPS Statistical Review 1996 re Break\&Enter # QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE ## NORTH COAST REGION ## RESEARCH UNIT ![img-1.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-49/img-1.jpeg) ## PROJECT STOPBREAK EVALUATION # Victim Survey ## Identification of Security Audit Recipients A CRISP macro command was created to assist in the identification of victims of break and enter offences who had received a Stopbreak security audit. This macro revolved around the premise that police officers who gave Stopbreak audits recorded these audits on their reports, and ensured this information was entered on CRISP, as they were instructed to do. The macro generated a list of the names, addresses, telephone numbers, dates of offence and crime numbers of a selection of victims of break and enter offences who had received a Stopbreak audit ${ }^{1}$. This list indicated that a total of 867 officers' reports, in all four divisions, contained the word 'stop'. This figure represents the maximum number of audits that were issued through the four trial areas ${ }^{2}$. Collectively, this represents approximately $50 \%$ of the entire break and enter offences committed in the trial areas in the year after the Stopbreak trial had commenced. The percentage of audits recorded as having occurred in response to break and enter offences ranged from $9 \%$ in Nambour Division to $74 \%$ in Bundaberg Division (see Table 2 for the figures in the other Divisions'). Table 2 | | Bundaberg Division | Hervey Bay Division | Nambour Division | Deception Bay Division | | :-- | :--: | :--: | :--: | :--: | | Number of Recorded Audits | 407 | 295 | 11 | 154 | | \% of B\&E's Given an Audit | $74 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $38 \%$ | It is recognised that CRISP statistics would include break and enter offences involving units, caravans and other holiday-style accommodation, and that these offences were not required to be folio wed-up with a security audit. This could explain the relatively small number of audits issued in comparison to the number of break and enter offences. An alternative explanation for the low percentage of audits given is that officers may have not included that they issued an audit in their reports, or this information may not have been recorded by CRISP operators. [^0] [^0]: ${ }^{1}$ Inclusion of the information pertaining to the date of reporting the offence, and address of the victims in the macro query, was useful in verifying the authenticity of the survey ${ }^{2}$ Determining the total number of audits that were given in each Stopbreak trial area was difficult. The macro used would have provided an over-statement of the number of audits given, as any text referring to the word "stop" in the officers' log or statements such as "a Stopbreak audit was not given" would also have been included in the count. Given the display limitations in the CRISP system, it would.be difficult to arrive at an exact count of how many audits had been given. # Methodology A questionnaire containing 7 items designed to survey the opinions of, and actions following, the Stopbreak security audit was created (presented as Appendix A). The questionnaire was designed with the time constraints of respondents in mind. Subsequent to identifying the victims of break and enter offences who had received a Stopbreak security audit (by the measures described above), these people were contacted by telephone. ## Sample In total, 62 people responded to the questionnaire. This figure represents $7 \%$ of the total number of officers reports that mentioned the word "stop" in them, however, as already discussed, the estimate of the number of audits given would have overstated the actual amount, due to the inclusion of statements such as "did not provide a Stopbreak audit". The low sample size was mainly due to time constraints, however, a number of other factors played a part. Such factors included: * not being able to contact people despite a series of calls during both work hours (minimum of 3 attempts) and after hours (minimum of 2 attempts) * a number of possible respondents had moved (attrition affect) * some people claimed they had never received an audit * one person declined to participate * one person was incorrectly identified as a complainant when they were actually an informant, due to an incorrect field entry in CRISP. Although the sample size was relatively low, external research suggests that it was adequate (Hall, 1996). Results * Seventy-nine percent of respondents who indicated they had received a security audit from police following their break and enter, implemented at least one of the security measures suggested by police. * Those respondents who had implemented security measures following police advice implemented, on average, two security measures. The number of measures implemented ranged from one to nine. However, this figure would obviously depend on the standard of existing security employed by victims' and the number of security measures suggested by police. * Approximately 26\% of survey respondents indicated that they would not have implemented these measures if police had not advised them to. However, the fact that roughly $44 \%^{3}$ of respondents said they would have implemented the security measures regardless of police advice, supports previous research which suggests that victims are able to recognise access points that would have been vulnerable to offender entry (Forrester, 1988). It also indicates that the experience of a break and enter is sufficiently terrifying to encourage victims to change the level of security they employ, of their own accord. The experience may also lead significant others, such as family members, to encourage and suggest changes to the victim's security. These two explanations were given by more than one victim who indicated they would have changed their security regardless of police advice. [^0] [^0]: ${ }^{3}$ The remaining $30 \%$ of respondents could not categorically answer 'yes' or 'no' to this question, and so, responded as 'not sure' * Encouragingly, $61.3 \%$ of respondents indicated that they only implemented the security measures that were suggested by police. More than one respondent suggested that the list provided by police was comprehensive enough to cover all possible additions. * On a five point scale ranging from very helpful to very unhelpful, approximately $57 \%$ of respondents indicated that they had found the security related information provided by police to be very helpful. Of the remaining $43 \%$ of respondents, $37 \%$ found the information helpful and $6 \%$ rated the information as neither helpful nor unhelpful. Information provided by respondents suggested that the latter rating was more likely to occur if the cause of the break and enter had been related to an open window or door, and police were unable to suggest anything else that needed improving. * Of those respondents who received a Stopbreak security audit, $87 \%$ have not experienced a break and enter related offence since. # Methodological Considerations 1. The survey instrument did not capture the data as well as desired. One of the main problems was that differences in the subjective interpretations of respondents ensured that people interpreted particular questions differently. For example, the question asking "did you implement any security measures not suggested by police ?" led some people to respond with "no, but I bought a dog after the break in", while others responded with "yes, I bought a vicious dog after the break in". Thus, some people categorised the purchase of a dog as a conscious security measure, while other people may have bought the dog for a number of reasons, and then later decided that the purchase of the dog could be indirectly valuable for security purposes. 2. Another issue is that the security advice provided by police at the scene would have influenced the responses to measures that were included in the questionnaire. For instance, the number of measures improved or implemented by break and enter victims in relation to police advice would have been dependent upon the number of measures suggested by police. Similarly, some people responded to the question "did you implement any security measures not suggested by police?" with "yes, I put sticks behind windows to prevent them from being able to be opened, while others responded with "no, I only put some dowel on the windows". In this case, differences in the interpretation of this question may reflect differences in the advice offered by officers on the scene, in that, if officers suggested dowel in windowsills, people may be more likely to categorise the implementation of dowel as being a result of police advice. In contrast, where police did not suggest such a measure, respondents would have labelled the implementation of this measure as not being related to police advice. 2. Some people, who were recorded as having received a Stopbreak audit in the officer's report in CRISP only received security advice verbally. These respondents were included anyway however, in an effort to increase the number of survey respondents, to improve the reliability and validity of the survey and increase the generalisability of results. 3. Some respondents appeared to find it difficult to separate the question "how helpful did you find the security related information provided by police following your break and enter" from issues regarding the helpfulness of the police in attendance at the scene. This was despite the fact that the surveyor utilised verbal measures to emphasise the terms "security related information". The phenomenon was illustrated when certain individuals indicated that they didn't implement any security measures suggested by police as "not much relevant advice was given", yet they rated the information provided by pofce as 'very helpful'. Ideally, the question could have been worded "on the following scale, how satisfied were you with the level of service provided by police in response to your break and enter offence", to ensure that every respondent was responding in relation to the same question. This question could then have been given to Stopbreak security audit recipients and a control group of break and enter victims who received a standard police response, in order to determine whether the public opinion of the police response was more favourable when Project Stopbreak was implemented. However, due to time constraints and a desire to guide complainants towards issues relating to the security audit information provided, it was decided that only audit recipients would be surveyed, and that they would be asked specifically about how helpful they had found the security-related information provided by police. This was aimed to minimise respondents' rating how helpful the police response was in general, which would have caused them to include such things as the time police took to get to the scene, whether or not the offenders were apprehended etc., in their rating. 4. Due to the start of the trial of Stopbreak being so long ago (1/7/96 in Nambour) some of the respondents found it difficult to remember some of the information required for the survey. In some cases people couldn't remember whether or not they had received a written or verbal audit, or whether or not this audit was done by police or an insurance agent. In most of these cases, the respondent was still included in the survey, particularly when the only uncertainty was whether or not they had received a written or verbal security audit. Hopefully, memory problems were also influencing a minority of victims who indicated that they hadn't received a security audit, even though the associated officer's reports on CRISP indicated that an audit had been given. In the most extreme case, 7 victims in Hervey Bay recorded as having received a Stopbreak audit in Officers' Reports on CRISP, professed that they didn't receive any such audít. The number of cases and percentage of the sample that had to be excluded from the survey for this reason in the other Divisions' is presented in Table 3. Table 3. Number and percentage of cases excluded from survey due to the person claiming they didn't receive a Stopbreak security audit. | | Bundaberg Division | Hervey Bay Division | Nambour Division | Deception Bay Division | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | No. of cases | 4 | 7 | 1 | 6 | | \% of sample excluded | $11 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $14 \%$ | Factors, such as the lack of a comparison control group, make it difficult to objectively quantify any benefits to victims who received a Stopbreak security audit. However, the victim survey presented, enabled general trends to emerge and allowed community members to provide their own anecdotal accounts of how effective they found ^ie procedures involved in Project Stopbreak. These anecdotal accounts came in the form of comments provided throughout the telephone survey, which were recorded on e-^ch respondent's questionnaire. These anecdotal accounts of the Project's success have been # OPERATION STOPBREAK SECURITY AUDIT ## RUNDAMING POLICE **Attending Officer:** ***_******_******_******_***__ **Phone:** ***_******_******_******_***__ **Date:** ***_******_******_******_***__ **Phone:** ***_******_******_******_***__ **Date:** ***_******_******_******_***__ ## PRESENT CONDITION **ADVISORY** ### Security Doors - ☐ Nil - ☐ Security door / Safety door - ☐ Keys left in or near the door ### Doors Exterior (main entry/exit door) - ☐ Keyed alike - ☐ Solid core / Hollow core - ☐ Key in knob entrance set - ☐ Mottice lock/night latch - ☐ Safety chain - ☐ Double cylinder dead - ☐ Door viewer ### Sliding Doors/Other Doors - ☐ Able to be secured - ☐ Fitted with key operated locks - ☐ Secured by dowel - ☐ Keyed alike ### Property - ☐ Engraved and stickers displayed - ☐ Valuables stored in bedroom ### Alarms - ☐ Security Alarm - ☐ Smoke alarms ### Telephone - ☐ Emergency numbers keyed in - ☐ Extension in bedroom ### Lighting - ☐ Sensor lighting fitted - ☐ Adequate lighting - ☐ Timer lighting ### Outside - ☐ Clear vision of doors/windows - ☐ Garden shed and tools secured - ☐ Wheelie bin/s chained/secured - ☐ Electricity meter box locked - ☐ House number large and visible ### Personal Security and Routines - ☐ Possess personal alarm - ☐ Home always secured ### Other Advice (e.g. electronic security) ### Contact Information - ☐ Install security door - ☐ Consider 'triple locking' mechanism - ☐ Do not leave keys in or near the door alternatively install hand guard ### Contact Information - ☐ To be keyed alike - ☐ Replace with solid core door - ☐ Fit double cylinder dead lock - ☐ Fit double cylinder drop pin lock - ☐ Replace safety chain with other security device - ☐ Install door viewer ### Contact Information - ☐ Install patio bolt - ☐ Consider 'triple locking' mechanism - ☐ Install double cylinder drop pin lock - ☐ Install deadlock (similar to Forrest) ### Repair Windows - ☐ Fit key operated locks - ☐ Install grilles/bars - ☐ To be keyed alike ### Contact Information - ☐ Engraved with code and stickers displayed (and recorded with QPS) - ☐ Contact Police/NHW re engraver - ☐ Store valuables elsewhere - ☐ Photograph Valuables ### Repair Windows - ☐ Fit key operated locks - ☐ Install grilles/bars - ☐ To be keyed alike ### Your Inscription - ☐ (as per brochure) ### Your Inscription - ☐ (as per brochure) ## CONFIDENTIAL **Other Advice (e.g. electronic security)** **41539111** **41539111** ## CONFIDENTIAL **Your Inscription** - ☐ (as per brochure)