---
title: "The Great Northern Arms Project"
type: "pdf"
year: "1999"
canonical: "/projects/1256"
---

![img-0.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-0.jpeg)

# VANCOUVER POLICE DEPAKIMENI OPERATIONS DIVISION DISTRICT 3 NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING TEAM 

April 28, 1999

# Table of Contents

- [VANCOUVER POLICE DEPAKIMENI OPERATIONS DIVISION DISTRICT 3 NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING TEAM](#vancouver-police-depakimeni-operations-division-district-3-neighbourhood-policing-team)
  - [To:  Deputy Chief Constable Blythe  I/c Operations Division](#to-deputy-chief-constable-blythe-ic-operations-division)
  - [From: $\quad$ Sergeant J. Maitland and Sergeant B. Morris  I/c D3 Neighbourhood Policing Team](#from-quad-sergeant-j-maitland-and-sergeant-b-morris-ic-d3-neighbourhood-policing-team)
  - [BACKGROUND :](#background)
- [ASSESSMENT:](#assessment)
  - [ANALYSIS:](#analysis)
- [ANALYSIS RESPONSE:](#analysis-response)
- [FINAL REVIEW:](#final-review)
- [CONCLUSION:](#conclusion)
- [VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT CPTED OFFICE](#vancouver-police-department-cpted-office)
  - [98-10-21](#98-10-21)
  - [525-555-575 E. 5th Ave. Great Northern Arms CPTED Review](#525-555-575-e-5th-ave-great-northern-arms-cpted-review)
- [CPTED practitioners follow five inter-related principles to achieve these goals:](#cpted-practitioners-follow-five-inter-related-principles-to-achieve-these-goals)
  - [Recommendations:](#recommendations)
- [Cost Estimate](#cost-estimate)
- [Analysis](#analysis)
- [Conclusion](#conclusion)
- [VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT COMMUNITY POLICING, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS SECTION](#vancouver-police-department-community-policing-research-development-and-analysis-section)
  - [Background](#background)
- [Summary](#summary)
- [PART VI LICENCES](#part-vi-licences)
  - [Chief Licence Inspector](#chief-licence-inspector)
  - [Powers of inspection](#powers-of-inspection)
  - [Duty to give access and information](#duty-to-give-access-and-information)
- [Power to suspend](#power-to-suspend)
  - [Appeal from suspension](#appeal-from-suspension)
  - [Procedure where suspension or revocation recommended](#procedure-where-suspension-or-revocation-recommended)
  - [Certain provisions of Liquor Act not to apply](#certain-provisions-of-liquor-act-not-to-apply)

## To:  Deputy Chief Constable Blythe  I/c Operations Division

## From: $\quad$ Sergeant J. Maitland and Sergeant B. Morris  I/c D3 Neighbourhood Policing Team

Subject: 1999 Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in POP

Sgt. Jim Maitland and I have reviewed the guidelines for the Herman Goldstein award and recommend that Constable Steve Callender meet the criteria. He has taken on problems in the Mount Pleasant area in an innovative manner utilising resources outside the Department. The attached documentation describes one landlord who owns several premises that were problematic to police. Cst. Callender's innovative approach to problem solving enabled the building owner to improve operation, which in turn reduced calls to service. The concepts used in this example could be easily applied to any problem situation.

## BACKGROUND :

The building at 525, 555, 575 East $5^{\text {th }}$ Avenue is known as The Great Northern Arms. It is one building linked together by lower level hallways and has three separate addresses. It is owned by one of the most notoriously negligent landowners in the City of Vancouver. Their reputation is to perform as little of their responsibilities as they can safely get away with while maximising profits from rental income. There is little or no regard for the tenants in their building, the surrounding neighbourhood or the community in which the building resides.

Cst. Callender has attended this building on numerous occasions while on regular patrol in response to calls for police service. It was well known to District Three members as a problem building with uncooperative managers and owners. However as a group of police patrol members there was no discussion about cleaning up the building and members continued answering calls to the address. Cst. Callender was assigned to one of ten squads in the District. Aside from chatting in the hallways at the office or in the locker room he and his colleagues had no idea how many other police members were attending there or of how much of a problem this

building really was. It certainly fuelled members' complaints about the ever- increasing call load in the district.

Cst. Callender was assigned to the Community Policing Office in July 1997. He was a novice with no experience or training regarding Community Policing and related concepts such as Problem Oriented Policing. He did have a lack of patience for repetition of duty particularly when it was plainly unsuccessful. Through closer work with the community, he began to hear more about this building and decided to examine what was driving the chronic problems. This is when he learned of the irresponsible building owners and the resulting problems. Thereupon, he experienced a steep learning curve. He had been a Patrol Constable and realised that he had limited knowledge of the resources available within the Police Department and beyond that within the City and the community. Through the Information Technology Section he very simply and quickly got an offline printout the CAD System showing the calls police attended at this building within a specified time frame. This would have been an impossible task to perform at the terminals members have access to. Cst. Callender quickly discovered that this one building was taking a lot of police time and energy and nothing was being resolved. We had attended this one building with 111 suites 309 times within fourteen months and this number was increasing. As the Community Police Officer, he was inundated with calls from neighbours of this building once they discovered he worked in the community. Cst. Callender developed response options since something clearly had to be done. It was apparent that the only thing that would motivate these owners was the 'bottom line'. He endeavoured to assess the cost of all this policing and compare it to a basic normal cost for the area and bill the owners for the excess. Both poorly and well-run buildings within the general neighbourhood were identified. One of the better complexes was right across the street. Cst. Callender took the raw data to the Planning and Research Section. Staff completed an excellent analysis that confirmed that the Police Department was spending an inordinate amount of time and resources on this one building in comparison to all of the other buildings in the surrounding area. (See Appendix B).

The original concept of billing the owners was not viable regarding the issue of charging user fees. The analysis did provide the raw data necessary to ultimately compel the owners to improve their property. Since this would not resolve the problem, Cst. Callender approached the Vancouver Police Department CPTED analyst, Constable Candy Anfield. Cst. Anfield works in consultation with the City Planning Department. She conducted an inspection of the building and wrote an excellent review with suggestions and explanations. (See Appendix A).

Cst. Callender represents the Police Department on the area Neighbourhood Integrated service Team (NIST), for the Mount Pleasant neighbourhood. NIST's represent all City Departments in neighbourhoods throughout the City. Through NIST, Cst. Callender conducted joint inspections with fire, health, and property use inspectors where they all adopted a position of zero tolerance. They have proved a very important resource in problem analysis and enforcement. The Parks Board NIST member was very useful in cleaning up the neighbouring park, which was part and parcel of the same problem. The City Licensing Department provided enforcement authority because a business licence could be suspended, revoked or denied based on poor business practices under the City of Vancouver Charter. (See Appendix C) Armed with the history of the building, Cst. Callender took his case to the Permits and Licenses Department. The owner was called to City Hall to meet with the head of this Department. Cst. Anfield's recommendations

are not bylaw or code and as such have no enforcement authority. However the owners were . advised to follow these suggestions or the entire file of information Cst. Callender had gathered would be presented to City Council at a hearing to revoke their right to a business licence within the City. This was a severe threat to them, as they own fourteen other properties within the city.

The owners have followed many of the suggestions within the CPTED Review and continue to progress. They have hired new assistant managers and evicted many of the drug-dealing tenants, many of whom had no tenant agreements. They report that they are screening their tenant applications as carefully as possible and the numbers would tend to support this. Cst. Callender continues to monitor the calls to this address monthly. The time involved is minimal compared with previous police response. Periodic inspections of the building are conducted with the NIST members. This follow up has never happened in the past and it has sent a strong message to the owner that they will not be allowed to regress.

The calls for police service until October 1998 averaged twenty-four (24) calls per month. Regular meetings with the owners took place throughout the fall of 1998. The calls for police service since November, 1998 average six (6). A $75 \%$ decrease in calls for police service to this building represents a reduction of 216 calls per year for the patrol district. Appendix B illustrates a dramatic reduction in calls for service to the building.

# ASSESSMENT: 

The common problems are building owners not screening tenants and allowing the buildings to deteriorate to the point where calls to service and neighbourhood complaints increase. This is the essential nature of the problem. The neighbourhood patrol Constable prior to being assigned to the Community Policing Office attended these problem premises. After transfer, the officer received complaints from the community about this premise.

The CPO officer, who also reviewed citizen complaints, noted calls for service to this premise had been steadily increasing over the years. The severe impact on the community of the problems generated from this one building identified it as a top priority. Initial analysis showed excessive street crime activities in and around this building that not only exceeds neighbouring buildings but also the entire community.

## ANALYSIS:

An analysis was done of the Computer Aided Dispatch off-line incident history from the Information and Technology section for the previous fourteen months. All written reports from Health, Fire \& Licensing were requested and all written police reports related to building were submitted.

Primarily, irresponsible owners created this problem. The building was literally full of prostitutes, pimps, drug dealers and thieves. The owner's motivation was to minimise maintenance costs while increasing rental income by indiscriminately renting to irresponsible tenants. The resulting impact on the neighbourhood shows an increase in property crime and

nuisance crimes. Neighbours were victims of property crimes, noise, traffic congestion, litter and associated increased street activity adversely affecting their quality of life. The neighbourhood was under siege. Neighbours were at risk due to close association with a criminal element. This put elementary school students at risk with an elementary school in direct line between this building and a major thoroughfare, East Broadway, where the prostitutes, pimps and dealers plied their trade.

The analysis revealed enormous number of calls for service that were draining police resources. The Patrol members who responded to 911 calls dealt with individual incidents and not the problem. Calls for service continued to increase and the patrol members were demoralised due to the inability to deal with the problem.

Computer Aided Dispatch was done off line. An incident history search showed 309 calls for service to this building from January 1997 to February 1998. Cst. Callender continued to get monthly reports from the Information Technology Section. These reports showed a high level of calls for service that were either remaining level or increasing per month despite the owners' claim that they were working on the problem. He requested a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design review by Cst. Anfield. She provided an excellent comprehensive report explaining the problem and recommending changes. A comparative cost analysis of Policing costs was done relative to neighbouring buildings. The community was involved in the analysis of the situation; neighbours were dealt with individually either by phone or in person and in groups at strata council meetings.

Cst. Callender co-ordinated inspections of the building that revealed a very poorly maintained building being continually damaged by its tenants. Analysis revealed that the owners have many other similar properties within Vancouver and are notorious as ineffective landlords. Their inept management style is based solely on profit. The City had been dealing in the past on this and other properties. When given orders for compliance under bylaws their response was minimal. The City had not co-ordinated enforcement or continued with many follow-ups and the building would then deteriorate to its previous state.

# ANALYSIS RESPONSE: 

A range of response alternatives were available using resources in addition to police in the City of Vancouver Neighbourhood Integrated Services Team (NIST). NIST responded with coordinated inspections of the building by the Inspectors from Environmental Health, Fire and Property Use and Licensing. The CPTED review was done. Cst. Callender liaised with the City of Vancouver Parks Board to clean up a park that was next door to this building. The park was between the targeted building and a housing co-op that was inhabited by young families. The park contained a children's playground and what was intended as a landscaped garden area on a bank down to the adjacent street. Due to budget restraints the landscaped area had been allowed to grow over. Squatters' shacks had been built in it and much of the activity related to the building was taking place in the park as well. Needles and condoms were regularly found in the playground. Street information was person known to police had hidden a handgun in there. Cst.

Callender requested the growth be taken down to the ground, attended while this was done and evicted the squatters out of the shacks.

The information gathered, relative to surrounding buildings' calls for police service, illustrated the problem in a manner that had never been done before. This property was a drain on. police resources. Meetings were held with City Law Department lawyers and the Property and License Section senior management. Essentially, the analysis supported the case that would compel the owners' appearance before City Council where they were advised to comply with CPTED recommendations and Tenant Screening Criteria. They were conducting business in an irresponsible manner that was a detriment to the community. Council could then order revocation of their business license that would not be reissued.

Before implementing the response plan co-ordinated Inspections were done, data gathered as well as a CPTED review done. Initially there was resistance by the owners. The owners> Police, Neighbourhood Integrated Service Team and Chief Licence Inspector and the City of Vancouver Law Department were all involved in the solution to the problem.

# FINAL REVIEW: 

A community program was presented to rental apartment management to screen tenants properly, legally and fairly. This was designed to offset the problems associated with displacement. Cst. Callender received anecdotal information of some of the known problem tenants obtaining other rental accommodations. However, it wasn't long before these parties were made to find new premises yet again.

The results were that the building has been cleaned up and is steadily improving. The $o \sim / m \& r . r$ evicted approximately $40 \%$ of their tenants, many of whom had no rental agreement. They hired two assistant managers. Calls for police service have reduced from twenty-five to thirty calls per month to six or seven calls per month.

Cst. Callender continues to receive monthly reports on the calls for service. Neighbours provide information regarding the decrease in activity. The owners are notorious for letting their buildings relapse after the scrutiny has reduced. Cst. Callender works in the community arid is able to personally monitor activity related to it. Recently, he conducted a follow-up co-ordinated inspection of the building that revealed marked improvement inside and out. These pro-active strategies have not been done in the past. The owners state that they now have adopted proper tenant screening techniques. That they currently have thirty vacancies that they are not rushing to fill supports their claim. Furthermore, they are satisfied with the manner in which the building is maintained in spite of the vacancies.

The evaluation of the response plan has served to motivate the personnel involved in it. There was significant improvement in addressing the problem in this manner. The goals accomplished a reduction in calls for police service and reduced citizen complaints. There was also a slight reduction of street activity on the main thoroughfare (Broadway). This is supported by analysis of CAD data of calls for service to this address. Within the process, it was identified that action

needed to be taken. The new strategies developed serve as a POP model to deal with problem premises throughout the City.

# CONCLUSION: 

Police resources involved in this problem analysis were the Neighbourhood Police Officer, Information Technology analyst, Planning and Research analyst and the CPTED analyst. Cst. Callender received POP Training during the project. The duties of a Neighbourhood Police Officer follows the POP model in identifying problems and seeking alternate methods of dealing with it without using police resources. No documented resources were available until the POP training was taken. The SARA problem model was not applied until sometime within the assessment stage to verify the perceived success of the project.
Cost analysis is absorbed in the salaried personnel who contributed to the project. No additional costs were incurred. Attached are the reports of Constable C. Anfield, CPTED (Appendix A), Melissa Holland, Research Analyst, (Appendix B) and provisions of the Vancouver Charter outlining Licences issued to businesses (Appendix C).

Cst. Calender's application of a problem oriented policing model to resolve community problems is reflected positively by the success of this initiative. He targeted one of the most notorious buildings in the District and through analysis of the issues; evaluation of options, cooperative involvement of resources and diligent follow-up has succeeded. Therefore, I recommend Constable Callender be nominated for the 1999 Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem Oriented Policing.

Respectfully submitted,
Barbara Morris, Sergeant 1244
District Three, Neighbourhood Policing Team

![img-1.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-1.jpeg)

# VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT CPTED OFFICE 

DATE:
TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

## 98-10-21

Steve Callender Mount Pleasant Crime Policing Centre

Candy Anfield CPTED Liaison Officer

## 525-555-575 E. 5th Ave. Great Northern Arms CPTED Review

The following recommendations regarding the rental apartments located at 525555 and 575 E. 5th Ave. are drawn from on site visits September 23 and October 21. This review was done on the request of Constable Steve Callender of the Mount Pleasant Crime Policing Centre. Constable Callender has been working closely with the City of Vancouver and the owners and operators of these rental apartments to resolve several issues regarding the conditions of these units.

The first part of this report provides a short over-view of CPTED or Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. This is helpful when recommendations may not seem reasonable or advantageous. While CPTED is best served at the initial design stages of any development, it can easily be implemented in existing structures.

CPTED is a proven Crime Prevention method utilized throughout North America and Europe. The concept is simple; by careful design of the built environment we can reduce fear and crime and create a better quality of life. CPTED recognizes three facts:

- Public peace is not kept by the police but by an intricate, almost unconscious pattern of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves. No amount of police can enforce civilization where the standard every day enforcement of it has broken down.
- Crime is predictable.
- Most crime is opportunity driven.

The three goals of CPTED are as follows:

- Reduce the risk of crime occurring.
- Reduce the amount of crime.
- Effect behaviour that calls for law enforcement.

# CPTED practitioners follow five inter-related principles to achieve these goals: 

1) Territoriality
2) Access Control
3) Natural Surveillance
4) Image/Maintenance
5) Environment

Territoriality simply means taking measures to make private, semi-private and public space dynamic. This is done to visually cue people that "this is my space". This does not necessarily mean tall shrubbery and visually permeable fencing. It can be as subtle as planters or edging along property lines.

Access control means different things to different projects. It can be as definitive as access codes and gating, or as subtle as textured floor tiles and color combinations. The Justice Institute of British Columbia used bubbled floor covering in the hallways of the instructional wings of the building. It is uncomfortable to stand on, forcing people to move and not stop to interact outside of the lecture and study halls.

Natural Surveillance means keeping an eye on space, whether the space is public, semi-public or private. The emphasis is on natural. Unlike the watch towers of medieval times, CPTED encourages such design options as having kitchens facing play areas. Exit stairs from residential underground parking lots being routed to courtyards, where, generally, most units would be facing.

Image/Maintenance stems from George Kelling's "Fixing Broken Windows" theory. An abandon building is relatively crime free, until the first act of vandalism. Once a wall is graffitied or garbage ignored, the building is "lost" in a matter of days. It is important to maintain a good image, which implies responsibility and ownership.

Environment involves the assessment of the land uses around the site. An obvious example of bad environment assessment would be the development of a neighbourhood pub a short distance from a seniors' home. Most developments have much more subtle environmental cues. A school and a fast food outlet are strong attractors. Any type of development built between the two must take into consideration pathways and specific user groups on the pathways.

The following is a list of recommendations for the rental residential units located at 525, 555 and 575 E. 5th Ave. Each recommendation has rational and in some cases, examples are sited.

## Recommendations:

1) Tne three entrances should be made more dynamic using larger signage, contrasting colors and specific lighting. Each door should have the name of the apartment and the number address painted on the glass.

All three addresses are interconnected and the very design of the Great Northern Arms has created problems. The three main entrances to this site are unresolved and the doors are not easily visible from sidewalk. This creates an opportunity for illegitimate users to walk anywhere on the site and "scope" possible targets (property or people) using the excuse of trying to find the front door. It is proven that buildings with strongly resolved entranceways have little or no problem with non-users walking around the property. First, there is no legitimate reason to do so, and secondly, legitimate users are more prone to report, or challenge nonusers. A strong entryway creates real or imaginary boundaries, which give strong cues to both the illegitimate user and the residents.
2) While the landscaping appears to be well maintained, some very general landscaping rules should be adhered to. Ground level units are most susceptible to Break and Enter. Shrubbery around entranceways and windows should be visually permeable or trimmed so as not to allow areas of concealment. The large hedging surrounding the utility meter should be trimmed down and thinned. Mischief (garbage dumped, people using the area for various reasons) is occurring in this area and probably has spread to different areas around the site.

3) The ground level units facing E. 5th Ave., are below grade and need much resolution to discourage theft and Break and Enter. Like the entrances to the apartment buildings, the ground units need to be defined. Landscaping (low or ground cover) and well-defined walkways, give territoriality cues to trespassers. This may encourage residents to use this section of their units more often and create positive activity in what is now an abandoned or abstract area.
4) The underground should be secured with operable gates both at the north and south entranceways. The underground should be painted white (increases light by $45-70 \%$ ). While there is signage on both driveways, it is faded and in disrepair. The signs should be replaced or at the very least painted. The underground parking is scary and insecure. The only vehicles in the underground appeared abandoned or in various states of mechanical distress. There was not one operable vehicle parked in the underground during the on site visits. This indicates that the underground is not a desirable area for the tenants. (Vehicles or personally). This is a direct result of the lack of security and the impression of lack of safety from the collection of abandoned vehicles and low lighting. It appears there was a security gate at the east entrance ramp from 5th Ave., at sometime, but it is no longer operable. This has resulted in two unfortunate occurrences. The entire east side of the building has now been abandoned. There is no surveillance overlooking the driveway, and any type of casual surveillance from vehicles being parked in the underground no longer exists. Garbage was strewn all around this area, and actual articles of clothing were hanging from the tree on the east side of the property. Illegitimate users are free to come and go as they please, leaving the underground susceptible to theft and mischief. The potential for crime against persons increases greatly in abandoned, unsurveilled areas.
5) Access to what appeared to be large vacant common areas, and "rooftop decks', was not controlled and it was obvious non residents were frequenting these areas. Consideration should be given to gating access to these areas. The vacant common areas could be used as storage for adjacent units and then secured accordingly.
6) The most prevalent and blatant problem observed at this site was the general lack of simple maintenance and upkeep. This included:

- $\quad$ Walkways in the courtyard were blocked by large tree branches, which had grown completely across the pathway. The fundamental use of the courtyard has effectively been canceled, creating an abandon space. Abandon space will eventually become areas for misuse and possible criminal activity.
- $\quad$ Lighting at entranceways, walkways, courtyards, common areas and around the building was dismal. While there were numerous light fixtures evident, many were damaged or broken or had no buibs in them. Rust, and refuse around these fixtures indicated they had been this way for a long period of time.
- Garbage was evident everywhere. While garbage along the edges of a complex can be expected, garbage in courtyards, hallways, alcoves and exits is not acceptable. A tenant was observed climbing into the large underground garbage container and jumping on top of an obviously over flowing receptacle in order to throw his garbage out. The tenant advised that this was a usual occurrence.
- $\quad$ The lock on the entrance door to 555 E. 5th Ave., was broken. This allowed unlimited entry to anyone. The on site manager advised this occurred on a regular basis. The lock on the door was not substantial and easily pried or broken. Each entry door should have a full length astragal with a substantial deadbolt and a non-rotating cylinder. An initial expenditure for sturdy hardware would mitigate any on going repetitive costs of replacing inexpensive, non-functional locks.
I was advised by the manager that a new lock was not going to be replaced until new tenants were brought in. This is not acceptable and puts the current tenants in a dangerous position.
- $\quad$ Maintenance on the inside of the apartments was somewhat better, but simple matters such as carpet cleaning and repair, wall and ceiling repair and painting must also be improved.

A clean and well maintained building will repay itself in many forms. It creates an atmosphere in which tenants will take responsibility outside their own front door and make them better keepers of the entire premise. Tenants will become confident and use the courtyards, parking facilities and outdoor common areas or patios more often, increasing natural surveillance and exerting territoriality and access control. This in turn will reduce the need to repair damages incurred from illegitimate users.

Liability cases brought to court by victims of criminal activities in and around residential units are prevalent in the United States and are increasing dramatically in Canada. CPTED has become an integral part in these lawsuits with regards to "foreseeability" and "totality of the circumstances". Factors, which the courts have taken into consideration, include the nature of the premises, the surrounding locale, the lacK of customary security precautions and implied services. Implied services include services not indicated by contract or agreement, but logically assumed by any reasonable person. In other words, although a contract does not state that locks will be installed at the entrance doors to a residential unit, the very fact that the premise is an apartment implies that locks will be provided.

Section 6(1) of the Occupiers Liability Act states "If premises are occupied or used under a tenancy under which a landlord is responsible for the maintenance or repair of the premises, it is the duty of the landlord to show toward any person who, or whose property, may be on the premises the same care and respect of risks arising from failure on the landlord s part in carrying out the landlord s responsibility, as is required by this Act to be shown by an occupier of premises toward persons entering on or using the premises."

Recently, a tenant of a rental building in a large city in Massachusetts sued the owners of her building when she was sexually assaulted in her apartment. The rear of the apartment was separated from a high crime area of the city by a forested area. Although the apartment building had provided and maintained standard security hardware, the victim successfully sued on the grounds that because of the buildings' proximity to a known criminally active area, extra security was reasonably expected. A Crime and Safety analysis of the apartment had indicated that surveillance at the rear of this apartment building was poor and specific recommendations had been ignored. The monetary award was much more then what the initial cost of securing the apartment site would have been.

Records indicate police calls for service to this rental apartment is approximateiy $150 \%$ higher than a similar rental unit (which has 77 more units then the Great Northern Arms) in the same area. It has the highest call rate in the area and accounts for a large number of police hours which translates to a huge financial burden to the City of Vancouver. The application of the recommendations cited in this report, along with the implementation of a strict rental agreement process will drastically reduce the need for excessive policing, and create a vital and desired residential unit.

Candy Anfield P.C. 1013
Vancouver Police Department

VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT
PLANNING, RESEARCH & AUDIT SECTION

November 24, 1998

To: Steve Callender, Constable 1380
Mount Pleasant Liaison Officer

From: Melissa Holland, Research Analyst
Planning, Research & Audit Section

Subject: Problem Premises Data (PR98-048)

Please find attached a report detailing an estimate of costs associated with policing problem premises as per your request. Please note the comment made by Jeanne Li, Manager, Planning, Research & Audit Section, asking that you consult with P&R if you are going to be using the results from this report outside the Department.

If you have any questions on the report, please contact me at 717-2689.

Melissa Holland
Research Analyst
M:\P\&R\PROJECTS\Pr98\048\memo to Callender.doc

November 20. 1998
To: $\quad$ Sarah Cavanagh. Strategic Research \&. Policy Advisor
Planning, Research \& Audit Section
From: Melissa Holland, Research Analyst
Planning, Research \& Audit Section
Subject: Problem Premises Data
PR98-048
Background
Constable Steve Callender, Mount Pleasant Liaison Officer, requested assistance from Planning, Research \& Audit Section in preparing an estimate of costs associated with policing several problem premises in his area compared to several well-run buildings. Constable Callender intends to share the cost estimates with City Legal. City Legal is interested in using the information to aid in evaluating the renewal of permits and licences forpooriy run buildings that can be described as problem premises.

Persons Consulted
Steve Callender. Constable 15SO. Mount Pleasant Liaison Off cer
Terry Nishi. Information Technology
3rać Cafferky. Constable 1340. Planning. Research \&. Audit Section
Ruben Sorge. Cor.stabie 14S9. Planning. Research \&. Audit Section

Method and Calculations
Computer Aided Dispatch fCADi Incident History Details were ran for eight buildings near the Mourn Pleasant Community Policing Centre. Cst. Callender classified four buifdings as well run premises and four buildings as problem premises. The buildings are similar in size (number of suites). Tne incident histories were run for these buiidings for a twelve-month period from July 1997 to June 199S.

Tne incident histories for each address provide the following information:

- the date and time the 911 call came in;
- the length of time to dispatch;
- the length of time from officers arriving on-scene to the call being closed;
- the type of call (e.g. family trouble, break and enier);

- the priority level of the call (1, 2 or 3 ); and
- the number of officers attending and whether or not they were one person or two person units, dog squad, ERT, wagon etc.

Note: Calls that are officer initiated and do not come through the 911 line are still recorded through CAD and appear on the incident history for the address. All the same information listed above is provided.

The data generated from the incident histories were compiled in an Excel 97 spreadsheet. The number of calls at each priority level was counted, and the duration of the calls was calculated for each incident, along with number of officers who attended the call. This information, including the type of officers (Patrol Units, Wagon, Dog Master, ERT) is presented in Appendix 1.

Note: Calls for which officers were not dispatched but a report was taken over the phone are counted in the total number of calls at each priority level. Since no officer time was allocated to these calls, they do not incur costs for the purposes of this report; however, they are counted in the total calls per premise. The types of calls that result in reports taken over the phone and no deployment of officers include theft from auto and theft of auto. Calls that are cancelled are also accounted for in the same way.

# Cost Estimate 

To estimate the costs associated with responding to police calls, the hourly wage of a $1^{\text {st }}$ Class Constable with benefits was used (S32.7255). The officers who responded to the calls in question ranged widely in pay grade from $4^{\text {th }}$ Class Constables to Sergeants. Examining the rank and pay grade of each attending officer for all calls was considered too time consuming for the scope of this report. Therefore, the $1^{\text {st }}$ Class Constable hourly wage with benefits was chosen as median and reasonable category.

Using the $V^{I}$ Class Constable hourly wage including benefits (S32.7255) multiplied by the number of officers attending the call multiplied by the length of the call (from on-scene to closed) provides a rough estimate of the wage cost for a given call. The sum of calls at each priority level for each building was totalled. This provides a cost estimate for each building and is presented in Appendix 1. The following provides the calculation steps followed:

1. S32.7255 x \# of officers x length of call = call cost
2. Total call costs for all calls at each priority level for each building

It could be argued that not all officers attending the call are present for the duration of the call from on-scene to close. To compensate for this, the dispatch to on-scene times (the transit times for officers to arrive at the call) were not included in the length of call calculations. As a result, calculating minutes per call and multiplying by all attending officers may slightly inflate the total cost per call, excluding the dispatch times deflates the cost per call. Therefore, the method used is a fair estimate of time resources allocated to the call.

Other important costs have been excluded from the cost calculations. These include fixed costs such as vehicle costs, administration, equipment, and special training (e.g. ERT and Dog Squad). In addition, the Mount Pleasant Community Policing Centre staff and Cst. Callender, the Mount Pleasant Liaison Officer, spend a significant amount of time dealing with issues related to problem premises in the Mount Pleasant neighbourhood. While these costs are hard to break down to a per call level, it should be noted that they are background costs that would increase the basic cost per call calculated in this report.

Another important cost not included in the cost estimate is the opportunity cost of taking services away from others by making other 911 callers wait because units are tied up with problem premises. A significant reduction in problem premises would enable police to provide better service to other members of the public.

The total costs per building were arrived at by totalling the costs for calls at each priority level (see Appendix 1). Since not all buildings have the same number of suites, Table 1 provides a calls per suite ratio and a cost per suite figure. These make it easier to compare the buildings.

Table 1 - Calls and Cost per Suite

|  Address | Number of Suites | Calls per Building | Calls per Suite | Cost per Building | Cost per Suite  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  1209 East Broadway | 37 | 29 | 0.78 | $\$ 2,192$ | $\$ 59$  |
|  2234 Prince Albert | 24 | 42 | 1.75 | $\$ 4,258$ | $\$ 177$  |
|  514 East 5th | 29 | 23 | 0.79 | $\$ 1,464$ | $\$ 50$  |
|  680 East 8th | 35 | 15 | 0.43 | $\$ 1,777$ | $\$ 51$  |
|  447 East 6th | 54 | 78 | 1.44 | $\$ 6,530$ | $\$ 121$  |
|  525 East 5th | 42 | 91 | 2.17 | $\$ 5,309$ | $\$ 126$  |
|  555 East 5th | 38 | 54 | 1.42 | $\$ 4,093$ | $\$ 108$  |
|  575 East 5th | 32 | 171 | 5.34 | $\$ 14,637$ | $\$ 457$  |

Note: Calls per suite ratio was calculated by taking the total calls per building divided by the number of suites. The cost per suite figure was calculated by taking the total building costs divided by the number of suites (see Table 1).

Cst. Callender identified 447 East $6^{\text {th }}, 525,555$ and 575 East $5^{\text {th }}$ as problem premises. The higher calls per building and calls per suite figures support this belief. The cost per building and cost per suite figures also support it. The one building identified by Cst. Callender as a well-run building that appears to be more of a problem premise is 2234 Prince Albert.

# Analysis

The two main factors that are driving the costs of policing problem premises are the number of calls and the number of officers deployed to attend the calls. The average length of call does not appear to be a differentiating factor between problem premises and well-run buildings. There is not a significant difference in the average length of calls at each priority level between problem premises and well-run buildings. The data for these three factors are discussed below.

The total number of 911 calls per premise is presented in Chart 1. It is clear that problem premises place a significantly greater number of calls to 911 requesting police services (see Chart 1 and Appendix 1). Not only do problem premises place more total calls to 911 , they place more priority 2 and 3 level calls (see Chart 2 and 3). Priority level 1 calls, the most serious, are significantly higher in one problem premise and only slightly higher in one other problem premise building compared to the well-run buildings (see Chart 4).

Note: Priority 1 calls include calls such as Robbery in Progress, Break and Enter in Progress, Gun Call, and Knife Call. Priority 2 calls include Family Trouble, Warrants and Suspicious Persons. Priority 3 calls include Found Property, Break and Enter report, and Theft from Auto reports.

![img-2.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-2.jpeg)

Chart 2 - Total 911 Priority 2 Calls; July 1997 to June 1998
![img-3.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-3.jpeg)

Well-run Buildings
Problem Premises

![img-4.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-4.jpeg)

Chart 4 - Total 911 Priority 1 Calls; July 1997 to June 1998
![img-5.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-5.jpeg)

As mentioned previously, one of the other factors driving the costs of policing problem premises is the total officer hours (see Appendix 1). This total is much higher for problem premises due to the number of officers deployed to attend calls at problem premises. The decision to send additional members rests with the assigned unit and/or the NCO. The dispatcher in the Communication Centre will typically run the premise history when a call comes in and advise the assigned unit of the history. If the premise has a long history, additional units are notified. Reasons for additional members attending a call at a problem premise include:

- danger to members;
- ongoing problems in the premises that require other than a minimal response;
- contents of the premise history indicates a history or violence and/or weapons; and
- the premise has a history of multiple suite violence.

It has been proposed that one possible reason for the increased costs of policing problem premises was that calls at these residences take longer than calls at well-run buildings. To test this, the average length of calls for all buildings was graphed for each priority level. The average length of calls for each priority level was calculated by taking the total time for all calls (within a priority level) and dividing by the number of calls.

The data show that only Priority 1 calls take longer on average at problem premises than well-run buildings and the number of Priority 1 calls are relatively small compared to level 2 and 3 calls. Therefore they have a minimal impact on total costs. Priority 2 and 3 calls seem to take roughly the same length of time, and in some problem premises, they take less time. The average length of calls for each priority level is presented in Appendix 2.

In summary, the main factors driving the basic costs of policing problem premises are the volume of calls and the number of officers required to attend those calls. The length of time spent at calls is not a significant factor affecting costs.

# Conclusion 

Incident histories for eight premises for a one-year time period were analyzed and presented in Appendix 1. Basic cost estimates for each building were calculated and the main factors influencing costs were identified for the year of data examined. Using these incident histories, a basic cost estimate for policing problem premises was calculated.

Cst. Callender had previously identified four of the buildings examined in this report as problem premises: 447 East $6^{\text {th }}, 525,555$ and 575 East 5th. The cost estimates, total 911 calls and number of officers deployed to attend calls at these buildings, support Cst. Callender's belief that these buildings consume more police resources than well-run buildings. One building, 2234 Prince Albert, should be looked at as a border line building. While total 911 calls for this building were relatively low, the total cost was on par with some of the problem premises. This building may need to be examined more closely.

This report has provided a basic cost associated with each premise and the main factors influencing the costs, namely the number of 911 calls and the number of police deployed to attend calls. It fulfils the request made by Cst. Callender.

Recommendation
I recommend that this report be submitted to Jeanne Li, Manager Planning, Research \& Audit Section for approval and then be forwarded to Cst. Callender for his consideration.

Melissa Holland
Research Analyst
Planning, Research \& Audit Section
M:P\&R Projects:PR98 048

Premises Data - July 1997 to June 1998

|  Address | Number of Suites | Priority ${ }^{1}$ | Number of Calls | Total Time | Number of Officers ${ }^{2}$ | Number of Wagon ${ }^{3}$ | Dog ${ }^{4}$ ERT $^{5}$ | Total Number of Officers | Total Officer Time ${ }^{6}$ | Cost per Priority Calls ${ }^{7}$ | Total Cost per Bldg.  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  1209 East Broadway | 37 | 1 | 3 | 01:40:43 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 4:20:24 | $\$ 141.70$  |
|   |  | 2 | 16 | 16:24:18 | 21 | 29 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 37 | 52:55:57  |
|   |  | 3 | 10 | 04:52:59 | 10 | 16 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 9:44:33  |
|  2234 Prince Albert | 24 | 1 | 3 | 02:12:29 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 10 | 7:30:41  |
|   |  | 2 | 15 | 13:07:53 | 23 | 35 | 5 | 2 | 7 | 49 | 66:04:09  |
|   |  | 3 | 24 | 20:42:54 | 21 | 30 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 33 | 56:33:21  |
|  514 East 5th | 29 | 1 | 6 | 04:48:18 | 10 | 15 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 19 | 30:43:35  |
|   |  | 2 | 7 | 06:40:44 | 7 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 8:22:47  |
|   |  | 3 | 10 | 04:18:41 | 7 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 5:37:57  |
|  680 East 8th | 35 | 1 | 3 | 5:44:59 | 7 | 13 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 16 | 46:26:49  |
|   |  | 2 | 2 | 0:26:39 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0:26:39  |
|   |  | 3 | 10 | 3:15:03 | 7 | 11 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 7:07:17  |
|  447 East 6th | 54 | 1 | 4 | 5:21:58 | 14 | 20 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 23 | 30:29:09  |
|   |  | 2 | 42 | 36:37:41 | 64 | 103 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 116 | 124:05:10  |
|   |  | 3 | 32 | 23:21:23 | 27 | 48 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 51 | 44:57:16  |
|  525 East 5th | 42 | 1 | 7 | 10:04:50 | 17 | 25 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 29 | 30:29:53  |
|   |  | 2 | 46 | 32:02:00 | 58 | 88 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 98 | 90:27:58  |
|   |  | 3 | 38 | 21:51:56 | 35 | 54 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 56 | 41:15:01  |
|  555 East 5th | 38 | 1 | 4 | 8:06:27 | 10 | 15 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 17 | 25:09:34  |
|   |  | 2 | 18 | 23:06:19 | 22 | 36 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 38 | 75:26:06  |
|   |  | 3 | 32 | 13:48:20 | 35 | 52 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 52 | 24:28:26  |
|  575 East 5th | 32 | 1 | 13 | 27:12:48 | 25 | 35 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 39 | 115:45:08  |
|   |  | 2 | 74 | 69:17:00 | 90 | 146 | 24 | 2 | 0 | 172 | 227:13:25  |
|   |  | 3 | 84 | 41:56:18 | 86 | 136 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 139 | 104:17:55  |

${ }^{1}$ Priority 1 calls include calls such as Robbery in Progress, Break and Enter in Progress, Gun Call, Knife Call. Priority 2 calls include Family Trouble, Warrants, and Suspicious Persons. Priority 3 calls include Found Property, Break and Enter report, and Theft from Auto reports. ${ }^{2}$ Number of Officers in Units (Cars and Bicycles). ${ }^{3}$ Wagens are staffed with one officer. ${ }^{4}$ Dog Unit is one dog and one Dog Master. ${ }^{5}$ ERT - Emergency Response Team (Total Officers). ${ }^{6}$ Total Officer Time is calculated by multiplying the total number of officers by the total time. ${ }^{7}$ Hourly Wage of a 1st Class Constable with benefits ( $\$ 32.7255$ ) was used to calculate cost.

![img-6.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-6.jpeg)

Priority 2 - Average length of Call; July 1997 to June 1998
![img-7.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-7.jpeg)

Priority 3 - Average length of Call; July 1997 to June 1998
![img-8.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-8.jpeg)

Well-run Buildings
Problem Premises

![img-9.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-9.jpeg)

# VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT COMMUNITY POLICING, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS SECTION 

November 24, 1998
To: $\quad$ Barb Morris, Sergeant 1244
Neighbourhood Policing Team Sergeant, District 3
CC: Bruce Chambers, Chief Constable
Steve Callender, Constable 1380, Mount Pleasant Liaison Officer
From: Melissa Holland, Research Analyst
Community Policing, Research, Development and Analysis Section
Subject: Update on Problem Premises Data
(PR98-048)

## Background

On April 12, 1999, Sgt. J. Maitland, requested an update of the data on the problem premises buildings that was performed for Constable Steve Callender under project PR98-048, dated November 24, 1998. I understand that this data will be used as an attachment to my previous report along with other supporting documents for the nomination of Cst. Callender for a Herman Goldstein Problem Oriented Policing Award.

Analysis
The problem premise data analysed under PR98-048 covered a one-year time period from July 1997 to June 1998. This analysis was a part of a POP project initiated by Cst. Callender. The results of the project were expected to manifest themselves in a reduction in 911 calls to the 525,555 and 575 East $5^{\text {th }}$ addresses commencing in November of 1998. As a result, the time frame of November 1998 to March 1999 has been compared to November 1997 to March 1998 for the problem premises established in the PR98-048 report. The buildings identified as problem premises were 447 East $6^{\text {th }}$ Ave, and 525,555 and 575 East $5^{\text {th }}$ Ave. The data for these buildings appear in Table 1. The table provides the call breakdown, number of officers deployed, total officer time consumed and a cost figure for the two time periods.

575 East $5^{\text {th }}$ Ave shows the most dramatic decrease in costs from $\$ 11,204$ (November 1997 to March 1998) to $\$ 990$ (November 1998 to March 1999). This represents a $91 \%$ drop. 555 East $5^{\text {th }}$ also showed a decrease in costs, from $\$ 1,105$ to $\$ 482$; a drop of $56 \%$. The costs for policing 525 East $5^{\text {th }}$ increased slightly from $\$ 2,355$ November 1997 to March 1998 to $\$ 2,851$ during November, 1998 to March, 1999, an increase of $21 \%$. The costs for policing 447 East $6^{\text {th }}$ Ave also increased from S2,149 (November,

1997 to March, 1998) to $\$ 5,571$ (November, 1998 to March, 1999), an increase of $159 \%$. Priority 2 calls appear to be the cause of this increase.

It should be noted that 447 East $6^{\text {th }}$ Ave was identified as a problem premise but was not part of the original POP project worked on by Cst. Callender in November of 1998. This building will be targeted in the next few months.

Chart 1 shows total 911 calls at each address during the November 1997 to March 1998 time period compared to November 1998 to March 1999. The chart shows that total 911 calls decreased at each address, most notably at 575 East $5^{\text {th }}$ Avenue, where 911 calls decreased by $87 \%$.

Chart 2 shows the total officer consumed for each address for the two time periods. Total officer time is a factor of the length of a call and the number of officers deployed to attend the call. A decrease in either will affect the cost figure. Total officer time decreased at 555 and 575 East $5^{\text {th }}$ These are the two addresses that the costs decreased for. 575 East $5^{\text {th }}$ Ave shows the most dramatic drop with a decrease of $91 \%$ in officer time consumed. 447 East $6^{\text {th }}$ Ave and 525 East $5^{\text {th }}$ Ave both show an increase in the total officer time consumed. The increase of $159 \%$ in total officer time consumed at 447 East $6^{\text {th }}$ Ave is consistent the large increase in policing costs for this building.

Chart 3 shows the total officers deployed at each address for the two time periods. The total number of officers deployed at each address decreased, most notably at 575 East $5^{\text {th }}$ Ave, a decrease of $94 \%$. The decrease in officers deployed is consistent with the decrease in 911 calls at these addresses.

Chart 4 provides a temporal view of total 911 calls to 575 East $5^{\text {th }}$ Ave from July 1997 to March 1999. The results of Cst. Calender's work with City Hall and the landlord are visible in the significant decrease in calls after November 1998.

# Summary 

Problem premise data was analysed for two comparable time periods. The data show a decrease in costs for two buildings ( 555 and 575 East $5^{\text {th }}$ Ave) and an increase in costs for the other two ( 447 East $6^{\text {th }}$ Ave and 525 East $5^{\text {th }}$ Ave). The results of Cst. Calender's work only begin to appear in November of 1998 and are reflected in changes in 911 calls, officers deployed, time consumed, and total costs for two of the three addresses targeted, namely, 555 and 575 East $5^{\text {th }}$ Ave. The costs for 525 East $5^{\text {th }}$ Ave increased slightly as a result of a lengthy Priority 1 call involving ERT.

If you have any questions on the report, please contact me at 717-2689.
![img-10.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-10.jpeg)

Melissa Holland
Research Analyst
MAP\&RVPROJECTS\Pr98\048\memo to B. Morris.doc

TABLE 1 Premises Data - November, 1997 to March, 1998

|  Address | Number of Suites | Priority ${ }^{1}$ | Number of Calls | Total Time | Number of Units | Number of Officers ${ }^{2}$ | Wagon $^{3}$ | Dog $^{4}$ | ERT $^{5}$ | Total Number of Officers | Total Officer Time ${ }^{6}$ | Cost per Priority Calls ${ }^{7}$ | Total Cost per Bldg.  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  447 East 6th | 54 | 1 | 2 | 1:14:05 | 7 | 11 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 7:08:49 | \$233.99 |   |
|   |  | 2 | 16 | 16:10:48 | 24 | 38 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 42 | 32:18:04 | \$1,057.03 |   |
|   |  | 3 | 18 | 13:41:52 | 16 | 29 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 26:12:59 | \$858.06 | \$2,149  |
|  525 East 5th | 42 | 1 | 3 | 3:40:17 | 9 | 14 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 17 | 25:37:49 | \$838.75 |   |
|   |  | 2 | 21 | 9:01:46 | 26 | 41 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 45 | 23:10:25 | \$758.58 |   |
|   |  | 3 | 14 | 10:09:59 | 13 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 23:09:17 | \$757.60 | \$2,355  |
|  555 East 5th | 38 | 1 | 2 | 2:27:12 | 5 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 11 | 12:23:08 | \$405.14 |   |
|   |  | 2 | 10 | 6:11:19 | 10 | 17 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 13:55:50 | \$455.87 |   |
|   |  | 3 | 9 | 4:00:22 | 12 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 7:27:50 | \$244.13 | \$1,105  |
|  575 East 5th | 32 | 1 | 8 | 24:38:03 | 19 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 28 | 108:27:11 | \$3,549.08 |   |
|   |  | 2 | 39 | 40:24:47 | 49 | 86 | 12 | 1 | 0 | 99 | 159:19:19 | \$5,213.83 |   |
|   |  | 3 | 38 | 21:40:28 | 42 | 72 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 74 | 74:35:20 | \$2,441.00 | \$11,204  |
|  Premises Data - November, 1998 to March, 1999 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |
|  447 East 6th | 54 | 1 | 3 | 1:42:37 | 4 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 5:47:18 | \$189.48 |   |
|   |  | 2 | 15 | 33:10:02 | 16 | 26 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 31 | 135:52:54 | \$4,446.74 |   |
|   |  | 3 | 9 | 20:15:01 | 18 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 26 | 28:33:58 | \$934.97 | \$5,571  |
|  525 East 5th | 42 | 1 | 1 | 9:58:14 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 69:47:38 | \$2,283.91 |   |
|   |  | 2 | 7 | 8:47:27 | 8 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 16:41:56 | \$546.52 |   |
|   |  | 3 | 1 | 0:37:30 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0:37:30 | \$20.62 | \$2,851  |
|  555 East 5th | 38 | 1 | 1 | 0:01:53 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0:03:46 | \$1.96 |   |
|   |  | 2 | 5 | 3:56:51 | 11 | 14 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 13:43:22 | \$448.99 |   |
|   |  | 3 | 3 | 0:56:10 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0:56:10 | \$30.76 | \$482  |
|  575 East 5th | 32 | 1 | 0 | 0:00:00 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0:00:00 | \$0.00 |   |
|   |  | 2 | 6 | 3:59:37 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 17:12:32 | \$563.21 |   |
|   |  | 3 | 5 | 5:10:09 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 13:01:58 | \$426.41 | \$990  |

${ }^{1}$ Priority 1 calls include calls such as Robbery in Progress, Break and Enter in Progress, Gun Call, Knife Call. Priority 2 calls include Family Trouble, Warrants, and Suspicious Persons. Priority 3 calls include Found Property, Break and Enter report, and Theft from Auto reports. ${ }^{2}$ Number of Officers in Units (Cars and Bicycles). ${ }^{3}$ Wagons are staffed with one officer. ${ }^{4}$ Dog Unit is one dog and one Dog Master. ${ }^{5}$ ERT - Emergency Response Team (Total Officers). ${ }^{6}$ Total Officer Time is calculated by multiplying the total number of officers by the total time. ${ }^{7}$ Hourly Wage of a 1st Class Constable with benefits ( $\$ 32.7255$ ) was used to calculate cost.

Chart 1 - Total 911 Calls;
November 1997 to March 1998 compared to November 1998 to March 1999
![img-11.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-11.jpeg)

Chart 2 - Total Officer Time for all 911 Calls;
November 1997 to March 1998 compared to November 1998 to March 1999
![img-12.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-12.jpeg)

Note: Time is in Hours, Minutes and Seconds
Chart 3 - Total Officers for all 911 Calls;
November 1997 to March 1998 compared to November 1998 to March 1999
![img-13.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-13.jpeg)

Chart 4 - Total 911 Calls to 575 East 5th Ave; July 1997 to March 1999
![img-14.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-71/img-14.jpeg)

Prepared by: Community Policing, Research and Analysis Section

Borrowing pending sale of debentures.
264. Council, without the assent of the electors, may, by by-law, authorize the Director of Fínance or some other person to borrow on behalf of the city by way of promissory note or overdraft such sum of money as Council may deem necessary' to meet the lawful expenditures of the city pending the sale of debentures. In any such by-law the Council may provide for the hypothecation to the lender of the proceeds of such debentures for the repayment of the sum borrowed and interest thereon.

1953-55-264; 1970-54-17.
265. [Repealed 1970-54-17.]

266 to 267A and 268. [Repealed 1993-54-69.]

# PART VI LICENCES 

## Chief Licence Inspector

269. There shall be a Chief Licence Inspector who, in addition to thej>owers and duties provided by this Act, shall have such powers and duties as the Council may assign to him from time to time.

1953-55-269; 1963-71-14.

## Powers of inspection

270. The Chief Licence Inspector shall have power to make or cause all necessary inspections to be made to ascertain whether the provisions of any Statute, regulation, or by-law assigning powers or duties to him or his staff are being carried out in the city.

1953-S5-270.

## Duty to give access and information

271. It shall be the duty of the owner and occupier of any real property in the city to give to the Chief Licence Inspector, and to any member of his staff authorized by him for the purpose, such access at any reasonable hour to such real property and every pan thereof, and such information with respect thereto, as may be reasonably required co enable necessary inspection to be made.

1953-55-271.

By-laws for -
272. (1) The Council may from time to time make by-laws

Licensing
(a) for providing for the licensing of any person carrying on any business, trade, profession, or other occupation;

profession, or other occupation at each of such places and to be subject to being licensed with respect to each place.

1953-55-276.

# Power to suspend 

277. The Chief Licence Inspector shall have power at any time summarily to suspend for such period as he may determine any licence if the holder of the licence
(a) is convicted of any offence under any Statute of Canada or of the Province of British Columbia;
(b) is convicted of any offence under any by-law of the city with respect to the business, trade, profession, or other occupation for which he is licensed or with respect to the relevant premises;
(c) has, in the opinion of the Inspector, been guilty of such gross misconduct in or with respect to the licensed premises as to warrant the suspension of his licence;
(d) has, in the opinion of such official,
(i) conducted his business in a manner, or
(ii) performed a service in a manner; or
(iii) sold, offered for sale, displayed for sale, or distributed to a person actually or apparently under the age of sixteen years any thing
that may be harmful or dangerous to the health or safety of a person actually or apparently under the age of sixteen years.

## Appeal from suspension

Any person whose licence has been suspended under this section may appeal to the Council in accordance with the procedure for that purpose prescribed by by-law, and upon such appeal the Council may confirm or may set aside such suspension on such terms as it may think fit.

1953-55-277: 1972-58-21.

## Procedure where suspension or revocation recommended

278. The Chief Licence Inspector may, in any case, recommend to Council in writing the suspension or revocation of any licence, setting out the reasons for such recommendation. The Council shall not suspend or revoke the licence without previous notice and an opportunity to be heard being given to the holder thereof, except when by reasonable efforts the holder cannot be found.

1953-55-273.

## Certain provisions of Liquor Act not to apply

279. Nothing contained in the Liquor Control and Licensing Act shall prevent the Council from providing for the licensing of the holder of a licence under the said Act.

1953-55-279.