--- title: "Unsolved Shootings Project" type: "pdf" year: "2003" canonical: "/projects/197" --- # UNSOLVED SHOOTINGS PROJECT # Table of Contents - [UNSOLVED SHOOTINGS PROJECT](#unsolved-shootings-project) - [Boston Police Department](#boston-police-department) - [Application for 2003 Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing](#application-for-2003-herman-goldstein-award-for-excellence-in-problem-oriented-policing) - [A. SCAN](#a-scan) - [B. ANALYSIS](#b-analysis) - [Retaliatory Nature/ Impact Players:](#retaliatory-nature-impact-players) - [Uncooperative Witnesses/Victims:](#uncooperative-witnessesvictims) - [G. RESPONSE](#g-response) - [Unsolved Shootings Project ${ }^{1}$ :](#unsolved-shootings-project-1) - [D. ASSESSMENT](#d-assessment) - [Outcomes:](#outcomes) - [Agency and Officer Information](#agency-and-officer-information) - [Attachment 1](#attachment-1) - [POLICE FIND THE BALANCE](#police-find-the-balance) - [City of Boston](#city-of-boston) - [Unsolved Shootings, 2001](#unsolved-shootings-2001) - [Attachment 4](#attachment-4) - [HAND-ME-DOWN GUNS](#hand-me-down-guns) - [Attachment 5](#attachment-5) - [Shootings / Impact Players Meeting: 4-9-03](#shootings-impact-players-meeting-4-9-03) - [Attachment 7](#attachment-7) - [9/3/02 - 4:47 PM](#9302-447-pm) - [1/13/03 - 12:45 AM](#11303-1245-am) - [6/1/01 - 9:30 PM](#6101-930-pm) ## Boston Police Department ## Application for 2003 Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing ![img-0.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-0.jpeg) Thomas M. Menino Mayor Paul F. Evans Police Commissioner Herman Goldstein Award Selection Committee Police Executive Research Forum 1120 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 930 Washington, DC 20036 Dear Herman Goldstein Award Selection Committee: I am very pleased to nominate the Unsolved Shootings Project for the prestigious 2003 Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. I speak for all partners involved in this project when I thank you in advance for your consideration of this initiative. The Unsolved Shootings Project is a strategy of systematic, focused intervention, using knowledge developed by a wide circle of collaborators to deter firearm violence. It focuses the work of law enforcement agencies in the city on unsolved shootings, in an effort to develop swift interventions aimed at deterring subsequent retaliatory firearm violence. The Unsolved Shootings Project is the result of comprehensive analysis and creative problem solving on the part of all stakeholders. Through regular working sessions among the spectrum of criminal justice agencies, on the local, state and federal levels, the partnership has honed its insight with two emphases: $\Rightarrow$ Solving shooting cases in which witness and/or victim reluctance is hindering prosecution $\Rightarrow$ Identifying the impact players who are driving the shootings, using all lawful and constitutional means to remove them from the community. The strategy is indeed working. Over the past year (March 2002 - January 2003), we have experienced a $20 \%$ decrease in unsolved shootings cases, primarily attributed to the effectiveness of law enforcement information sharing at these meetings. The problem-solving model was critical to the development and implementation of the Unsolved Shootings Project. It is this model that continues to guide our thinking around the prevention of firearm violence in the City of Boston. Again, thank you for your consideration of this nomination. I look forward to hearing your thoughts on this initiative. ![img-1.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-1.jpeg) Scan: In 2001, Boston experienced an increase in firearm violence, coupled with an unacceptably low clearance rate for shootings. This created a sense in the community that things were getting out of control. In response, Boston Police brought together key partners to scan and detail what was happening. Initial analysis pointed to some new factors at work: $\Rightarrow$ Older offenders returning from incarceration and becoming involved in criminal incidents in various combinations as perpetrators, victims, witnesses and associates. $\Rightarrow$ Younger offenders organized in new street gangs variously allying with and contesting with older offenders. $\Rightarrow$ An increase generally in the youth population in some traditional hot spot neighborhoods, including the Roxbury, Mattapan and Dorchester sections of the City. $\Rightarrow$ Resurgent drug markets in key hot spot neighborhoods. Analysis: As a result of the Scan, four major factors emerged specific to shootings: 1) most shootings were geographically clustered in three hot spot neighborhoods, 2) a disproportionate number of shootings appeared to be retaliatory in nature, with "impact players" being involved in a large percentage of unsolved shootings - both as offender and victim, 3) a high percentage of shootings involved uncooperative victims and/or witnesses, and 4) no formal process existed for district detectives to come together to discuss cases. Response: The Analysis suggested two key tactics for reducing shootings: 1) target the most difficult but strategically important cases. The vast majority of these cases involve situations where the victims, offenders, and witnesses are familiar with each other but are unwilling to cooperate with law enforcement. 2) thoroughly review these cases that have been impeded by uncooperative witnesses and develop alternative means for intervention. Bi-weekly working sessions were established whereby cases from hot-spot neighborhoods were divided according to their police districts. The process brings together those officers and agents who are most familiar with the key impact players in firearm violence, their criminal histories, behaviors Boston Police Department: Unsolved Shootings Project 2003 Herman Goldstein Award Application and associations in the neighborhoods. The goal is to focus intensively on the small number of those most at-risk for committing violent offenses, in order to have a large impact on the overall rate and number of violent crimes. Assessment: The process by which we investigate and intervene in shooting cases has improved dramatically. Open communication and sharing of information in a bi-weekly forum, focusing resources on impact players, immediate classification of "retaliatory" shootings, and increased use of data and intelligence in these cases has resulted in a $20 \%$ decrease in total shootings, and a corresponding $25 \%$ decrease in unsolved shootings - which is a subset of all shootings, and the type of shooting we are targeting with this initiative. This translates into a 5\% improvement in clearance rate for all shootings. In addition, 82 "impact players" are currently off the street and in secure facilities. We believe that these results are directly attributable to the effectiveness of law enforcement information sharing through the Unsolved Shootings Project. # A. SCAN In 2001, Boston experienced an increase in firearm violence, coupled with an unacceptably low clearance rate of $23 \%$ ( $77 \%$ of all shooting cases were "unsolved"). Specifically, in comparison to 2000, 2001 saw: $\checkmark$ A $17 \%$ increase in firearm calls for service $\checkmark$ A $12 \%$ increase in Part One Violent Crime with a Firearm $\checkmark$ A $31 \%$ increase in total shootings $\checkmark$ A $50 \%$ increase in homicides with a firearm $\checkmark$ A decrease in clearance rates for shootings, from $37 \%$ in 2000 to $23 \%$ in 2001 $\checkmark$ A decrease in clearance rates for homicides with a firearm, from $54 \%$ in 2000 to $36 \%$ in 2001 With shootings on the rise and shooters seemingly getting away scot-free, there was a sense in some of Boston's most high-risk neighborhoods that things were getting out of control. Reacting to this increase in firearm violence, this feeling quickly spread to the community as a whole, creating a general sense of unease and worry. In response, Boston Police Commissioner Paul Evans directed Supt. Paul Joyce, Commander of the Bureau of Special Operations and architect of previously successful youth violence strategies, to bring together key partners to scan and detail what was happening on the streets of the City. Initial analysis of the incidents pointed to some new factors at work. Some of these factors were: $\Rightarrow$ Older offenders returning from incarceration and becoming involved in criminal incidents in various combinations as perpetrators, victims, witnesses and associates. $\Rightarrow$ Younger offenders organized in new street gangs variously allying with and contesting with older offenders. $\Rightarrow$ An increase generally in the youth population in some traditional "hot spot" neighborhoods, including the Roxbury, Mattapan and Dorchester sections of the City. $\Rightarrow$ Resurgent drug markets in key hot spot neighborhoods. Boston Police Department: Unsolved Shootings Project 2003 Herman Goldstein Award Application Clearly, the uptick in firearm violence and the high percentage of unsolved shootings pointed to the need to focus attention on shootings. From November 2001 to January 2002, a series of strategy sessions were held, specifically to focus on shootings. (See Attachment 1 for Boston Globe editorial.) The first meeting involved Superintendents of the Boston Police Department. The second meeting involved District Commanders, the third, District level detective supervisors, and the fourth, District Detectives with Youth Violence Strike Force Officers. Local and federal prosecutors also took part in the discussion, providing valuable insight. The Office of Research and Evaluation was also brought in to provide additional data analysis regarding firearm incidents. The idea was to start with citywide trends and a big-picture perspective and then get more and more focused, more and more refined in the analysis. # B. ANALYSIS As a result of the Scan, four major factors emerged specific to shootings: 1) most shootings were geographically clustered in three hot spot neighborhoods, 2) a disproportionate number of shootings appeared to be retaliatory in nature, with "impact players" being involved in a large percentage of unsolved shootings - both as offenders and victims, [see next page for definition of "impact players".] 3) a high percentage of shootings involved uncooperative victims and/or witnesses, and 4) no formal process existed for district detectives to come together to discuss cases. Geographic Focus: "Hot-spot" neighborhoods, namely, Mattapan, Dorchester and Roxbury, are labeled so because they experience disproportionately high numbers of violent and firearm incidents. They also have the highest poverty rates and are the most diverse of all Boston neighborhoods. Moreover, the Department of Correction report that more than $50 \%$ of inmates from Massachusetts correctional institutions are released to these three neighborhoods. Shootings - both total and unsolved, are Boston Police Department: Unsolved Shootings Project 2003 Herman Goldstein Award Application concentrated in these neighborhoods. All of these items point to the need for a response focused on these key areas of the Gty. (See Attachments $2 \& 3$ for maps illustrating this point). [Please note, the South End was brought into the process later, following a spate of shootings in that neighborhood.] # Retaliatory Nature/ Impact Players: A review of incident reports showed that older offenders, returning from county, state and federal incarceration, were showing up again. They appeared sometimes as victims and sometimes as perpetrators. We also saw a new generation of younger offenders emerging on the scene. In some cases the older offenders were fighting with the younger cohort over turf. In other cases they collaborated. The highest-impact players continued to shun the criminal justice process, preferring instead to settle matters themselves. This preference for settling matters themselves created a cycle of retaliation wherein the initial victim (or victim's associate) ends up an offender. "Impact players", defined as those repeat and high-risk offenders who are active in hot-spot areas, were involved in cycles of retaliation and therefore many repeat incidents. Based on our collective experience and criminal justice research, our hypothesis is that repeat offenders are the driving force behind violent crime and that a comparatively small portion of these offenders leverage a large fraction of violent incidents, through ongoing, intensive retaliations and other behavior. This points to a response that focuses on impact players in an effort to make the biggest impart in reducing shootings. ## Uncooperative Witnesses/Victims: Analysís also revealed a primary reason for cases remaining unsolved: the reluctance of witnesses and victims to step forward and assist in prosecution. This was due in part to fear and intimidation. It also reflects the fart that many victims were indeed impart players themselves and chose personal retaliation instead of the criminal justice system to resolve issues. Suffolk County Boston Police Department: Unsolved Shootings Project 2003 Herman Goldstein Award Application District Attorney's Office (SCDAO) prosecutors estimate that in $95 \%$ of firearms cases the victims or witnesses are unwilling to come forward. For those who are not impact players, victims and witnesses feel intimidated and fearful. This is especially true in cases of gun violence that involve ongoing retaliation between groups or gangs. Given that in many cases defendants attend court with visible support from numerous gang associates, witnesses appear in court only to face heavy intimidation. Unsurprisingly, they often recant their statements. Younger witnesses are even less likely to come forward. Given these factors, the Boston Police and partners recognized the need to devise an alternative strategy (response) for intervening in this cycle of retaliatory violence - a strategy not dependent on the cooperation of victims and key witnesses. In addition, the goal of the project evolved from clearance to deterrence, with clearance becoming an objective for achieving the goal. Lack of forum for information sharing: The City of Boston is only 48 square miles, with the hot spot districts of B2, B3, and C11 covering approximately 15 square miles. Given that this relatively small area is broken up into three police districts, inevitably there are cases that overlap multiple districts. Many shooting cases crossed district boundaries, yet there was no formal process or forum for district detectives to come together to discuss cases. Similarly, prosecutors did not have a forum to discuss cases with district detectives. This pointed to the need for a response that provided such a forum for detectives to share intelligence and conduct joint problem-solving. # G. RESPONSE ## Unsolved Shootings Project ${ }^{1}$ : [^0] [^0]: ${ }^{1}$ The Unsolved Shootings Project is one of four key elements of Boston Strategy II. Strategy II received the "Outstanding Comprehensive Strategic Plan Award" at the Department of Justice's Project Safe Neighborhoods national conference in Philadelphia, January 2003. This model to reduce firearm related violence was selected from among 93 federal districts nationwide. Boston Police Department: Unsolved Shootings Project 2003 Herman Goldstein Award Application The Unsolved Shootings Project was developed as a response to the analysis outlined in Section B. The goal emerged as deterrence, with case clearance becoming an objective, or tool for achieving the goal. This initiative was created to be a strategic approach to the reduction of firearm violence, with the overall goal being the reduction of the incidence of firearm violence among the young adult population of Boston. The analysis previously discussed suggested to two key tactics for achieving this goal: 1) target the most difficult but strategically important cases. The vast majority of these cases involve situations where the victims, offenders, and witnesses are familiar with each other but are unwilling to cooperate with law enforcement. And 2), thoroughly review these cases that have been impeded by uncooperative witnesses and develop alternative means for intervention (i.e. drug investigations, domestic violence cases, focusing on victims). In essence, accessing any and all law enforcement tools available to break the cycle of retaliatory violence. In February 2002, BPD Superintendent Paul Joyce convened the first working session of law enforcement partners. At this meeting, he presented the analysis and proposed a general strategy for intervention. The law enforcement partner agencies have been meeting regularly ever since to review cases involving an unsolved shooting. Members of the Unsolved Shootings Team are: $\Rightarrow$ Boston Police - hot spot district detectives, Ballistics Unit technicians, Youth Violence Strike Force (YVSF) officers, and detectives from the Drug Control Division (DCD), and Major Case Squad. $=>$ Boston Police - Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE) civilian research crime analysts $\Rightarrow$ Suffolk County District Attorney's Office prosecutors $=>$ U.S. Attorney's Office prosecutors $=>$ And agents from DEA, ATF and the FBI (Boston Office) The Unsolved Shootings Project has evolved significantly since this first meeting. Originally, this project focused more on cold cases in an effort to stem retaliatory violence. All unsolved shooting cases in the hot spot districts since 1990 were reviewed. This proved to be unwieldy, and thus the focus was narrowed to more recent unsolved cases, and then further refined after six Boston Police Department: Unsolved Shootings Project 2003 Herman Goldstein Award Application months to the strategy of current shootings and activities of impact players. Other improvements and adjustments have been made throughout the process. Meetings were changed from once a week to once every two weeks after four months to allow for a longer follow-up period between meetings. A review of Board of Probation records for all firearm arrestees was added to the meetings after six months at the suggestion of prosecutors to better enable them to make immediate determinations regarding where the impact player would best be charged. And District D4 detectives and the Drug Control Division and were added in June 2002 and February 2003 respectively, as they were identified as critical to the process. Cases from the hot-spot Boston neighborhoods of Roxbury, Dorchester, Mattapan, and the South End are the focus, and are divided according to their police districts (B2, C11, B3, and D4 respectively). The process brings together those officers and agents who are most familiar with the key impact players in firearm violence, their criminal histories, behaviors and associations in the neighborhoods. The goal is to focus intensively on the small number of those most at-risk for committing violent offenses, in order to have a large impact on the overall rate and number of violent crimes. Through open communication and sharing of intelligence by the various law enforcement partners, participants are able to identify the impact players - those who pose the highest risk of violence and whose names and associates re-appear from case to case. Through case reviews they are also able to specify the relationships between various players that spark on-going retaliatory behavior. Once identified, law enforcement partners devise a strategy to work in coordination to close the net around these players. As previously discussed, the majority of witnesses are unwilling to come forward, therefore these meetings provide a means for law enforcement to search for other avenues through which they can apprehend impact players. Alternative strategies look towards Boston Police Department: Unsolved Shootings Project 2003 Herman Goldstein Award Application utilizing all possible legal levers such as pursuing alternative charges which can be brought on offenders, charging them federally, revocation of probation, parole, or DYS, etc. One alternative strategy being employed with success is using perjury charges to prevent retaliation. Last spring, there was a shooting at Madison Park High School's prom, held at a prominent downtown hotel. The victims' friends (who had witnessed the incident) clearly knew who the shooter was, but refused to cooperate with police, intending instead to settle things themselves. These three witnesses were themselves well known impact players. Prosecutors called the witnesses before the grand jury, and promptly charged them with perjury when they lied on the stand about the incident. This use of perjury as a "lever" was successful in averting a retaliatory shooting by getting three volatile impact players off the street. Another very successful strategy is identifying guns that have been used in multiple incidents and using this physical evidence as leverage over the offender. For example, in July of 2002, police recovered a .22 -caliber handgun used in a Hyde Park home invasion. Ballistics experts had previously linked this gun to seven nonfatal shootings over a two-week period in June (6/13-6/28), spanning four different police districts. It was suspected that more than one person used the gun. Police were able to use this evidence as leverage to get information in other cases. This notion of "hand me down" guns was highlighted, in the context of the Unsolved Shootings Project in an October, 2002 Boston Globe editorial. (See Attachment 4) Prosecutorial and law enforcement teams then intensively investigate and follow-up each case in the ensuing two-week period and report back to the group. Prosecutors, being on board from the beginning, are now able to build a stronger case against these offenders, as well as pursue fast-track prosecutions with harsher penalties. The Boston Police Department's Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE) is responsible for documenting, tracking and analyzing the Unsolved Shootings Project. Analysts are integral to Boston Police Department: Unsolved Shootings Project 2003 Herman Goldstein Award Application the process, documenting and presenting citywide firearm trends, collecting and presenting ballistics matches in a new and innovative format that identifies links between cases, staffing the bi-weekly meetings, and collecting incident report data to document the number of unsolved shootings cases, as well as the status of cases. As meetings progress, they also track and record the status of impact players within the criminal justice system once identified. ORE collate an entire data set of unsolved shooting incidents and determine the effect of the unsolved shootings meetings on the number of cases that go unsolved. The Process - at the Working Session: At the beginning of each meeting, ORE gives an overview of citywide firearm activity trends and hot spots (arrest data, firearm recoveries and calls for service). They also relay information from Gang Intelligence Meetings regarding impact players recently released from prison and expected to return to Boston neighborhoods. In addition, ORE presents ballistics matches made on firearms recovered in the past two weeks. This information is extremely useful in making connections between shootings. [See Process between Working Sessions section for elaboration.] Perhaps the most important thing that happens at the bi-weekly working session is the categorization of all new shootings. Based on intelligence information and collective knowledge of police and prosecutors regarding the victim, offender, and circumstances of the incident, the case is classified as "retaliatory", "non-retaliatory", "solved", or "domestic". [Please note, in this case "retaliatory" refers to the likelihood of the victim to retaliate, not that the shooting was itself retaliatory in nature. Likewise, "non-retaliatory" refers to cases in which retaliation by the victim is not expected. It is a forward-looking classification system.] By using this classification system, "retaliatory" cases can be prioritized for intervention, in keeping with the goal of preventing the subsequent retaliatory shooting. Boston Police Department: Unsolved Shootings Project 2003 Herman Goldstein Award Application Accountability is key to the success of this project. At each meeting, the detectives and prosecutors with cases assigned in each hot spot district must report out on firearm activity over the previous two weeks. Detectives and prosecutors go over all shootings and arrests, details for each arrest, ongoing operations (with DCD, YVSF, etc.), status of impact players, and open cases. Regarding impact player status, each district has a list of impact players, who are moved off the list as they are "taken off the street". They are moved off the list even if it is for a relatively short time period - such as two weeks in jail. When new incidents occur, they are classified and assigned to appropriate detectives and prosecutors instantly. For each new firearm arrest, ORE runs a Board of Probation check, which they then bring to the meeting. Having the arrestees' complete criminal history in front of them, prosecutors are able to confer and decide instantly if the case will be prosecuted locally or federally. Lastly, specialized units report out on their activities - Ballistics, U.S. Attorney's Office, and DA's Office (cases assigned, grand jury investigations, and trials). Team members are held to a very high standard, and respond accordingly. Intelligence information is thorough and extremely detailed. Intervention strategies developed are tightly focused and tailored to the individual impact player. Interagency collaboration, cooperation, and joint problem-solving are the standard. (See Attachment 5 for a sample meeting agenda illustrating accountability of Team members.) The Process - between Working Sessions: Between working sessions, police and prosecutors gather additional intelligence, complete interventions, and work on building cases for prosecution. Essentially, law enforcement partners follow up on strategies, assignments, leads and connections identified at the working session, and prepare to report back on activities. ORE analysts spend the two weeks between meetings collecting and analyzing data, and preparing their findings for presentation at the next meeting. In addition, they work with the Boston Police Department: Unsolved Shootings Project 2003 Herman Goldstein Award Application Ballistics Unit to create visual displays that track the paths of guns used in shootings, through recovered firearms as well as spent ammunition. Before the Unsolved Shootings Project, when Ballistics made a match using the Integrated Ballistics Imaging System (IBIS), they would send a report back to the district where the incident occurred. There was no communication regarding other possible connections. In addition, processing of recovered firearms was slow due to district delays in getting the firearm to Ballistics, and delays in tracing the firearm through IBIS once it arrived at the Unit. Now, the speedy processing of recovered firearms has been prioritized, which has been tremendously helpful to this initiative. Further, ORE has developed a format for displaying evidence that makes connections and linkages between cases. ORE geocodes all IBIS matches, then adds mug shots, names, dates and brief details of the incident to the "map". In this way, the full path of the gun is revealed. (See Attachments $6 \& 7$ for examples.) After one full year of implementation, ORE looked at all open shootings since January 2002. They then highlighted those unsolved shootings that had any ballistics matches associated with them and linked that case to all of its ballistically-matched incidents (e.g. shots fired, firearm recovery, and other non-shooting incidents). Some of these matched incidents go back as far as 1996. We anticipate that this will lead to a fresh look at older unsolved shootings. # D. ASSESSMENT In assessing the Unsolved Shootings Project, it becomes clear that the biggest gains made so far are in process and communication, as dictated by the Scan and Analysis. The Scan undertaken by the Boston Police revealed new factors at work in the City: $\Rightarrow$ Older offenders returning from incarceration and becoming involved in criminal incidents in various combinations as perpetrators, victims, witnesses and associates. $\Rightarrow$ Younger offenders organized in new street gangs variously allying with and contesting with older offenders. $\Rightarrow$ An increase generally in the youth population in some traditional hot spot neighborhood, including the Roxbury, Mattapan and Dorchester sections of the City. $\Rightarrow$ Resurgent drug markets in key hot spot neighborhoods. In the Analysis phase, Police and partners further refined these factors specific to shootings/unsolved shootings. We found that 1) most shootings were geographically clustered in three hot spot neighborhoods, 2) a disproportionate number of shootings appeared to be retaliatory in nature, with "impact players" being involved in a large percentage of unsolved shootings - both as offenders and victims, 3) a high percentage of shootings involved uncooperative victims and/or witnesses, and 4) no formal process existed for district detectives to come together to discuss cases. The Unsolved Shootings Project was designed as a response to this analysis. Major improvements were made in the way we addressed shootings. Specifically, process refinements new and improved include: - Focusing on "impact players" and retaliatory violence - Clarification of project goal to focus on deterrence, with case clearance becoming an objective to achieve the goal - Immediate categorization of all shootings as "retaliatory", "non-retaliatory", "domestic" or "solved"; allowing for the prioritization of cases - The creation of regular working sessions which provided a forum for intra- and interagency information sharing around these cases. - Immediate assignment of cases, both to district detectives and prosecutors - High level of accountability to which all team members are held - Use of alternative investigations to obtain leverage over offenders - Rapid processing of ballistics evidence - Timely analysis and dissemination of data Success Story; On October 28, 2002, Stephen Black was shot in the Grove Hall neighborhood of Roxbury. (Note, names have been changed) Surviving the incident, he refused to cooperate with police by naming his shooter. A few weeks later, Kevin White and Demone Brown were shot, also in the Grove Hall neighborhood. Like Black, they refused to cooperate with police. Ballistic evidence showed that they were shot with the same gun as Black. All three victims were Boston Police Department: Unsolved Shootings Project 2003 Herman Goldstein Award Application known to police, gang-involved, and considered "impact players." Street intelligence suggested that in both cases, the shooters were gang-involved impact players from the Academy Homes housing development. Police were very concerned that if not addressed, this situation could quickly erupt into a major gang feud. Over the next few months, district detectives and their Unsolved Shootings Team partners worked diligently on this case, using drug investigations and perjury charges against the suspects' girlfriends to get the information they needed to make arrests. Owen Blue and Byron Green were arrested, while the third suspect fled the state. Both shooters are now in jail where they are awaiting trial. By taking them off the streets - removing the targets of retaliation - a major gang war was averted. This is an example of the kind of case prioritized for intervention, as well as an illustration of the kind of alternative strategies (ballistics evidence, drug investigations and perjury charges) employed to intervene in the cycle of retaliation. # Outcomes: The process by which we investigate and intervene in shooting cases has improved dramatically. Open communication and sharing of information in a bi-weekly forum, focusing resources on impact players, and increased use of data and intelligence in these cases has resulted in a decrease in shootings and a corresponding increase in the percentage of cases solved. Indeed, in comparison to 2001, for 2002 Boston experienced a $20 \%$ decrease in total shootings, and a corresponding $25 \%$ decrease in unsolved shootings - which is subset of all shootings, and the type of shooting we are targeting with this initiative. (See figure below) This translates into a 5\% improvement in clearance rate for all shootings - going from $23 \%$ to $28 \%$ of shootings solved. This evidence suggests that we are solving more cases by focusing on "retaliatory" shootings (those shootings where the victim or his associates are likely to retaliate against the shooter), which in turn is decreasing the overall number of shootings by successfully intervening in this cycle of retaliation. Boston Police Department: Unsolved Shootings Project 2003 Herman Goldstein Award Application We believe that these results are directly attributable to the effectiveness of law enforcement information sharing through the Unsolved Shootings Project. Boston Shootings 2001 vs. 2002 ![img-2.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-2.jpeg) Another outcome measure for the Unsolved Shootings Project is number of "impact players" taken off the streets. As discussed previously, ORE maintains a fluid list of impact players in each of the four hot spot districts. When an impact player is locked up, for whatever reason - e.g. parole violation, drug charge, outstanding domesúic violence warrant - he is taken off the current list of impact players, and placed on a separate list until such time as he is released from custody. At that point, he is placed back on the current impact player list for continued intervention. Currently, there are 82 impact players on this list, meaning there are 82 impact players being held in some type of secure facility. This represents 82 potential retaliatory shooters or victims, for whom interventions have worked, albeit only temporarily in many instances. However, this temporary resolution may be just enough to stop the cycle of retaliation for some of these offenders. We will continue to refine evaluation methods as we go forward. Looking back at the first year of implementation of the Unsolved Shootings Project, Boston Police and partners have identified additional best practices as well as set goals for 2003. Additional best practices include: $\checkmark$ DA notification of all firearm arrests $\checkmark$ 48-hour indictment Boston Police Department: Unsolved Shootings Project 2003 Herman Goldstein Award Application $\checkmark$ De-briefings $\checkmark$ Roll-Call Briefings on legal and training issues New goals for 2003 include: 1. All shootings entered into Detective Case Management system (DCM) 2. Focus on monitoring and mapping the release of all offenders, knowing where they're returning to and being aware of any court-involved conditions. In addition, an off-shoot of the Unsolved Shootings Projea is an ambitious gang assessment project currently underway. Currently, we have a comprehensive database detailing all feuds and alliances between gangs in Boston. We are now working on a comprehensive list of gang memberships. We anticipate that this database will be prove to be an invaluable tool in further preventing violence in the City. # Agency and Officer Information 1. Supt. Paul Joyce, Chief of the Bureau of Special Operations, spear-headed this initiative for Commissioner Paul Evans. District detectives from B2, B3, C11 and D4, as well as officers from the Youth Violence Strike Force, were centrally involved in this project. In addition, officers from the Ballistics Unit, detectives from the Drug Control Division and Major Case Squad, and civilian research analysts were integral to the project. Externally, prosecutors from the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office and U.S. Attorney's Office, as well as agents from the ATF, FBI and DEA were involved in the project. 2. All Boston Police officers receive mandatory in-service training at the Boston Police Academy on problem -oriented policing and problem solving. 3. Detectives and officers were given extensive recognition for their accomplishments by Police Commissioner Paul Evans, BPD command staff, and leaders throughout the City. 4. The guidelines used to manage this initiative were the BPD's written rules and procedures. Timely and accurate data was an extremely important resource for this project, including several ORE databases and mapping programs, ballistics evidence (IBIS), and district level intelligence data. 5. No problems or issues were identified during this initiative in regards to the problemoriented policing / problem-solving model. 6. No external funds were used to support this strategy. Department personnel listed in question \#1, participated in the project as part of their ongoing responsibilities. 7. Project Contact Person: | Name: | Jim Jordan | | :-- | :-- | | Position/rank: | Director, Office of Strategic Planning and Resource Development | | Address: | One Schroeder Plaza | | City/State: | Boston, Massachusetts 02120 | | Phone: | $(617) 343-5096$ | | Fax: | $(617) 343-5073$ | | Email: | jordanj.bpd@ci.boston.ma.us | # Attachment 1 ## POLICE FIND THE BALANCE Date: January 19, 2002 Page: A14 Section: Editorial HOPING TO CATCH UP with a runaway murder rate, the Boston Police Department this week launched several initiatives to curb violent crime. Equally important, Boston Police Commissioner Paul Evans made clear that he opposes heavy-handed "zero tolerance" tactics that sometimes reduce criminal activity but heighten tensions between police and residents of low-income neighborhoods. Police officials are struggling with two distinct challenges: vengeance-minded ex-cons who are looking to make up the ground they lost during prison stays and hard-charging criminologists who argue that social control through aggressive police tactics - such as widespread misdemeanor arrests - is a more effective use of time and resources than forming neighborhood partnerships to address root causes of criminal activity. Evans is striving for intelligent balance. His "unsolved shooting project" focuses on 130 nonfatal shootings last year that police fear could lead to retaliatory violence. Many victims refuse to cooperate with police. On the investigatory end, police are examining the backgrounds of victims to determine any connections to gangs, drug crime, or prison feuds. But they are also encouraging church and community groups to reach out to the victims to prevent reprisal shootings. Some groups are ahead of the curve. Andre Norman, a field organizer for the Ella J. Baker House in Dorchester, conducts frequent workshops with ex-offenders. Norman, who served 14 years for armed robbery and attempted murder, is convinced that ex-offenders like himself bring the required "authenticity" to the task. In a recent "Call to Action" document, he makes a convincing argument for expanding reentry programs that include everything from Bible study to vocational training. The most efficient way to reduce violent crime, however, remains the targeted prosecution of individuals who are known to police as habitual offenders. That strategy led to dramatic decreases in juvenile crime during the 1990s, Wisely, Evans is employing the tactic again, this time against an older group of felons who are haunting the city's streets. District police captains, especially in high-crime sections of Roxbury and Dorchester, need to intensify their efforts to identify the so-called "impact players" in their districts. The urgency felt by residents in high-crime areas must be shared by the police who are sworn to protect them. ![img-3.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-3.jpeg) City of Boston Total Shootings, 2001 ![img-4.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-4.jpeg) # City of Boston # Unsolved Shootings, 2001 ![img-5.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-5.jpeg) # Attachment 4 ## HAND-ME-DOWN GUNS Date: October 19, 2002 Page: A16 Section: Editorial VIOLENT CRIMINALS in Boston are becoming less choosy about their firearms, leading to multiple uses of the same gun by multiple felons. This means the public safety climate should improve significantly each time police confiscate a so-called "community gun." "In the 1990s, kids wanted guns new in the box," says Police Superintendent Paul Joyce. But now, he says, a gun, even "with a body on it," is more likely to stay in local circulation. So far this year, police have identified 41 firearms that have been involved in 114 separate shooting incidents. Joyce believes that many of the individual weapons were used by different shooters. In July, for example, police recovered a .22-caliber handgun in a Hyde Park home invasion. Ballistics experts linked the weapon to seven nonfatal shootings over a two-week period in June. One man is suspected in four of the shootings. But the gun, police believe, may have fallen into different hands for the other three. Other subtle shifts that require fresh responses can be seen across the city. Special units no longer focus mainly on youths in the 16 -to-24 age range, as they did in the 1990s. The average age of today's "high-impact player," in Joyce's words, is about 30, and he was recently released from jail or prison. But youths as young as 11 are also known to police for serious criminal activity. Law enforcement officials took an innovative step this week to better track ex-inmates. Some parolees now report directly to the police station in Fields Corner for processing and follow-up by parole officers. This Dorchester pilot program could have a major impact if the Legislature ever sees the wisdom of passing a sentencing reform bill that includes provisions for mandatory supervision of released inmates, a public safety advance that is long overdue. Police are also being more innovative in the area of data analysis. Until recently, police researchers worked largely on youth gang containment. Now analysts have been assigned to each of the city's 12 police areas, and detectives, ballistics experts, and prosecutors meet biweekly to analyze unsolved shootings and explore crime reduction strategies. Police hope to see results in Grove Hall, where spikes in violent crime this summer destabilized a comeback neighborhood. Police researchers have identified 214 individuals whose names kept reappearing either through intelligence or at arraignments. Now officers are targeting about 50 of the most hard-core offenders for arrest and prosecution while steering others to social and intervention programs. There is some thinking in Boston that the police have lost the focus that earned them national accolades for crime reduction in the 1990s. But recent initiatives suggest that the department is living on more than past glory. # Attachment 5 ## Shootings / Impact Players Meeting: 4-9-03 I. Overview of Firearm Activity (ORE) - IBIS Matches - Recent Releases - Firearm Activity Trends \& HotSpots II. Current Firearm Activity A.) District D-4 \& DAs - Shootings \& Arrests - maps - Arrests - detailed listings - Ongoing Operations (District, DCU, YVSF) - Impact Players - Open Cases B.) District C-11 \& DAs - Shootings \& Arrests - maps - Arrests - detailed listings - Ongoing Operations (District, DCU, YVSF) - Impact Players - Open Cases C.) District B-3 \& DAs - Shootings \& Arrests - maps - Arrests - detailed listings - Ongoing Operations (District, DCU, YVSF) - Impact Players - Open Cases D.) District B-2 \& DAs - Shootings \& Arrests - maps - Arrests - detailed listings - Ongoing Operations (District, DCU, YVSF) - Impact Players - Open Cases E.) Other Activity - Shootings \& Arrests - detailed listings F.) YVSF - Other On-Going Operations - Impact Players III. Reporting Out of Specialized Units a) Ballistics b) US Attorney's Office c) D.A.'s Office: Cases Assigned, Grand Jury Investigations, Trials ![img-6.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-6.jpeg) ![img-7.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-7.jpeg) ![img-8.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-8.jpeg) ![img-9.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-9.jpeg) ![img-10.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-10.jpeg) ![img-11.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-11.jpeg) ![img-12.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-12.jpeg) ![img-13.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-13.jpeg) **Attachment 6** **XXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** **XXX XXXX XXXX** ![img-14.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/03-02/img-14.jpeg) # Attachment 7 ## 9/3/02 - 4:47 PM - **Address:** ABDW CC# 020493087, 121 Intervale St., B-2 - **Victims:** XXXX, XXXXX, XXXXX, XXXX ## 1/13/03 - 12:45 AM - **Address:** Firearm Possession, CC# 030021305, 417 River St., B-3 - **Victims:** XXXX, XXXXX, XXXXX, XXXX ## 6/1/01 - 9:30 PM - **Address:** ABDW CC# 010292991, 15 Wainwright St., C-11 - **Victims:** XXXX, XXXXX - **Varrant:** XXX, XXXX