--- title: "Problem Ownership Support Team" type: "pdf" year: "1999" canonical: "/projects/401" --- $99-16$ in Award Oriented # A SINGAPORE OF OWNERSHIP # Table of Contents - [A SINGAPORE OF OWNERSHIP](#a-singapore-of-ownership) - [BURGER WILL](#burger-will) - [Taking Ownership to the Next Level](#taking-ownership-to-the-next-level) - [ABSTRACT](#abstract) - [PROBLEM OWNERSHIP SUPPORT TEAM $\cdot$ Taking Ownership to the Next Level](#problem-ownership-support-team-cdot-taking-ownership-to-the-next-level) - [A Word About Edmonton](#a-word-about-edmonton) - [The Problem Realized](#the-problem-realized) - [THE APPLICATION OF S.A.R.A.](#the-application-of-sara) - [Scanning](#scanning) - [Analysis](#analysis) - [Response:](#response) - [Team Mandate:](#team-mandate) - [Supervisor Selection Process:](#supervisor-selection-process) - [Number of Personnel on the Team:](#number-of-personnel-on-the-team) - [Length of Term on Team:](#length-of-term-on-team) - [Team Selection Process:](#team-selection-process) - [Team Critique:](#team-critique) - [Requests For Team Use:](#requests-for-team-use) - [Assessment](#assessment) - [Appendix I](#appendix-i) - [AGENCY and OFFICER INFORMATION](#agency-and-officer-information) - [Thank You for Considering Our Submission:](#thank-you-for-considering-our-submission) - [Appendix II](#appendix-ii) - [PROBLEM OWNERSHIP SUPPORT TEAM STATISTICS](#problem-ownership-support-team-statistics) ## BURGER WILL ## Taking Ownership to the Next Level Submitted by: The Edmonton Police Service May 5th, 1999 # ABSTRACT ## PROBLEM OWNERSHIP SUPPORT TEAM $\cdot$ Taking Ownership to the Next Level The Edmonton Police Service has long been considered a leader in the area of community based and problem oriented policing in Canada. Among many important initiatives, which have taken place in this vein, the principle of assigning ownership of geographic areas to specific officers was initiated with the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in 1988. Ownership has further expanded since that time and the result has been a very favorable and healthy relationship between the individual communities and their police. Despite this, by the mid1990's, the location and type of criminality in Edmonton was changing and ownership officers were experiencing difficulties in dealing with some of the most serious community concerns. The most notable of these were the perennial problems of prostitution, drug houses, property and youth crime. The problem was that we were not providing front line officers with the resources required to deal with these and other problems. We had not specifically been scanning for the presence of this internal problem. It came to light as a result of complaints from citizens and community groups, an analysis of calls for service and neighborhood crime trends, as well as concerns expressed by ownership officers assigned to the communities. By the very nature of the problem, it had existed for some time and was not isolated to a single community or patrol division. It was the type of problem that could impact front line police service delivery regardless of agency or location. It also involved a host of stakeholders ranging from citizens, police, offenders and even municipal administrators and elected officials. On August 14, 1996, Sergeant Denis LEBLANC (then a Constable) and I submitted a proposal to the Superintendent in charge of Downtown Patrol Division identifying the problem and presenting a solution to remedy it. Once identified and substantiated, the problem received immediate attention because of its potential impact upon the concept of problem solving as a whole. Our proposal called for the formation of a Probfem Ownership Support Team. This would consist of a team of six constables lead by a sergeant which would be directly responsible to front line ownership officers. They would be completely flexible with shifting and deployment - working in uniform or plain clothes depending upon the nature of the problem. They would operate under a strict problem-solving framework and would NOT assume overall responsibility for problems from the assigned ownership or beat constable. Instead, the ownership officer would supplement the team as coordinator for the duration of the project and then retain his or her ownership by monitoring the problem upon conclusion of their initiative. The team would be a group of "generalists" acting as an extension of the front line ownership officers and working directly with, and within, the communities dealing with any problem requiring a team response. The proposal was fine-tuned by a Divisional Planning committee, which recommended that the idea be adopted. The recommendation was accepted and the Problem Ownership Support Team (POST) became operational on November 04, 1996. POST was immediately embraced by the divisional ownership officers and the synergy and excitement within the Downtown Division was evident. Some very creative efforts were put forward to deal with a host of difficult problems. Within the first six months of operations, the team had been utilized in more than 50 projects targeting problems ranging from break and enters, drug houses, prostitution, thefts of/from automobiles, aggressive panhandling and public intoxication. Again, all projects were undertaken with a view to addressing problem persons, locations or situations causing concern to the community and the police. POST was a huge success in Downtown Division. Some of the most vocal communities that had previously criticized police for allowing problem situations to continue had begun to thank ownership officers for their good work in addressing those same situations. Job satisfaction for ownership members was at an all time high as the presence of POST as a resource created endless possibilities when it came to tackling problems and brainstorming responses. The creation of this team also offered a tremendous opportunity for front line officers who wished to participate as a member of the team. Assigned members were exposed to a huge variety of problem solving initiatives lead by some of the most successful and innovative front line problem solvers within the Edmonton Police Service. While the success and importance of POST is not measured by statistics, the numbers that have been generated are impressive. Essentially, the concept of ownership, one of the keys to community based policing, has been taken to the next level. Overall responsibility for areas has been left with individual officers as this was demonstrated as being effective in the beginning. What has changed is provision of an invaluable resource to front line ownership officers that can be used in any imaginable way to enhance their problem solving efforts. Many projects have been aimed at persistent and perennial problems such as prostitution, drug houses, property and youth crime. POST works with ownership officers and the community to implement long term and lasting solutions while also providing short-term relief from the nagging symptoms of the problem where necessary. This initiative began in Downtown Division; however, has spread throughout the other three patrol divisions within the Edmonton Police Service. There has also been interest expressed by other police agencies both in and out of Alberta. This initiative is another chapter in the evolution of community based policing in Edmonton - a chapter in which we are very proud! ![img-0.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-16/img-0.jpeg) # A Word About Edmonton The Edmonton Police Service has long been recognized as a leader in the area of Community Based and Problem-Oriented Policing in Canada. Progressive police managers in the mid-1980's steered our organization out of what has come to be known as the "Era of Professional Policing" that was dominant throughout most of the century. This transformation in thinking challenged many deeply rooted traditions and beliefs about what policing was and how it should be done. What resulted was a renewed commitment to front line policing starting with the recognition that the city was comprised of smaller cities (neighborhoods) each with individual policing needs. The important concept of ownership was introduced, "beats" were re-estabiished and staffed with foot patrol officers responsible for identifying and solving problems in their areas. Numerous community stations were opened and volunteers and citizen patrols from within the community supplemented police staffing. Street level officers were given increased latitude to work with the community to implement lasting solutions to actual problems. As years went by, internal mechanisms were put in place to assist members in identifying specific problems and locations. The concept of ownership was later expanded to include areas not contained in the Foot Patrol Program. Most patrol officers were assigned a geographic area and were responsible for devoting a solid effort toward proactively working within it. Community Based and Problem Oriented Policing had evolved (and continues to evolve) very nicely in Edmonton. The removal of police members from cars and offices has broken down many barriers and the citizens are eager to work with "their officers". Everything was going great...or was it? # The Problem Realized It was the summer of 1996 and it was busy! The provincial government had, in an effort to balance budgets, undertaken a host of cutbacks affecting everything from police budgets to social and outreach programs. Despite heroic efforts by our front line members, property crime numbers were high and citizens were reporting increases in prostitution, drug houses and public order offenses that accompany the two. One inner city neighborhood in particular was holding public forums in which they were openly critical of police for letting these problems get "out of hand". Sgt. LEBLANC (then a Constable) and I were ownership members who had working Patrol assigned to the city's Downtown Division. We were wholehearted supporters of Community Based Policing; however, we did not believe that front-line members were sufficiently equipped to solve (or contribute to the solution of) many of the problems plaguing their communities. Our current strategies were tremendously strong in the areas of problem identification and even solving when individual officers could address them through community networking. What we were not properly addressing were the perennial and social problems, which included prostitution, drug houses, and property crimes and gang activity. We paid lip service to our realization that many of these concerns could never be completely eliminated and agreed that the definition of "solving" should be expanded to include lessening the severity of the problem, moving the problem from a sensitive location, and targeting specific individuals who were responsible for a disproportionate contribution to the problem. It was time to do some of this type of solving on the street while still maintaining an overall commitment to long term strategies. # THE APPLICATION OF S.A.R.A. ## Scanning We had not specifically been scanning for this internal problem we faced. The problem began to manifest itself through community complaints about problems not being adequately addressed. Supervisors began to look at ownership members for answers. They discovered that these officers were, in fact, applying problem solving processes and dealing effectively with those problems they were equipped to handle. The issues which the community continued to be unhappy about centered on larger perennial problems (social ills if you please) such as prostitution, drug houses, properly crime and issues concerning youth. Ownership members were not ignoring these problems. It was simply that their ranges of responses were limited. Many approaches were undertaken to deal with these issues on a case by case basis. In the end; however, the community and the officer were left with a group of motivated offenders some of whom openly admitted that they viewed these neighborhoods as "gold mines" which were "ripe for the picking". Once the problem was identified by the community, indicators of its' existence became blatantly obvious. Community stations telling of problem individuals and locations had received stacks of reports. Many had not been followed up and were concluded as "information". We realized that citizens in one district had phoned in countless reports about problem prostitutes. Our evaluators in communications had not been entering these complaints for dispatch, instead, voicing the complaint to patrol units as "information". Nobody was assigned, nobody was accountable and, in many cases, nobody went. There was no question that legitimate concerns were in existence which we, because of our paradigm and policies of that day, were not effectively dealing with. This particular problem received immediate Divisional attention once it was identified and substantiated. While there were other competing matters to tend to, this problem received a high priority because of its' potential impact upon problem solving itself! It was felt that if we could better equip ownership members to deal with the most pressing community concerns (in the long and short terms), we would further increase public confidence in their police and improve quality of life for people in many neighborhoods. # Analysis As mentioned previously, citizen complaints, increased calls for service as well as other quantifiable indicators were used to analyze this problem. Ownership members were in agreement that the issues, which their customers were complaining, the loudest about were the very issues that they were having trouble dealing with. By its very nature, this problem had existed for some time. Despite that, nobody really noticed for reasons, which I will explain. When we first entered into the era of Community Based Policing the public immediately noticed a huge improvement in the delivery of police service. Gone were the days of being passive recipients of police efforts - now they were actually being consulted and included in policing matters which concerned them. The public support for police during this time probably kept complaints to a minimum. In addition, citizens residing in the lower socio-economic districts had long been forced to deal with the "hot" issues of prostitution, drugs, and property and youth crime. They did not expect miracles to happen because the police changed the way that they were doing business. What they did grow to expect was a higher level of accountability than they had in the past. Now, they are exposed to police more frequently than ever before. There is ample opportunity to express concerns to an officer whom they know well and whom they see often. When they make a request or an inquiry, you can bet they will be checking for (and anticipating) results the next time they see that officer. While the issue of increased accountability played a role in the identification of our problem, it was not wholly responsible. The community concerns that had always existed had remained at a level that people had grown tolerant to. In the mid 1990's; however, two factors in particular emerged which had significant impact upon criminality in Edmonton. The patience of the community was being tested! The issues were as follows: I.) The provincial spending cuts had significant impact on nearly all provincial portfolios. Less spending in all sectors meant fewer jobs and, at the same time, cuts were also made to social and outreach programs. These factors, along with less funding for justice and corrections, contributed to an increase in prostitution, drug use, as well as youth and property crime. 2.) Crack cocaine! The increase in popularity and use of cocaine in the smokeable form resulted in an explosion in the number of people seeking and abusing this drug. The use of crack cocaine seems to know no boundaries! It has been detected in both men and women, young and old, rich and poor. The increase in popularity of this drug again can be linked to increases in prostitution, drug use and trafficking, as well as nearly every other type of criminality and destructive behavior imaginable. As the problems associated to these primary community concerns intensified, quality of life was definitely affected in many neighborhoods. It was the public's frustration with this situation, combined with the enhanced accessibility to (and accountability of) the police who ultimately exposed the weakness in the approach we were taking to deal with these problems. Many stakeholders were involved in this problem. Police managers were concerned about public confidence in the police service itself. Front line officers were frustrated by not being able to adequately satisfy many of the concerns that were obvious in their assigned areas. Members of the public had the most difficult position, particularly if they were residents of the most seriously affected areas. The situation was slowly eroding their very sense of safety and security. The City of Edmonton itself was even involved, at least by proxy. While administrators expected that the communities (including the police) would be able to resolve the problems, many good (tax paying) citizens were not prepared to wait. Many homes were going up for sale with the type of people we needed to keep opting to leave the neighborhoods and in some cases the city. The last main group involved in this problem was the offenders themselves. This group of people was enjoying the fact that ownership officers were spread very thin and sometimes unable to provide sustained resistance to their activities. As our analysis of this problem continued, we realized that this problem was not isolated to Downtown Division. The resources issue directly affected every member assigned to every community within the city. While the specific problems in each community varied greatly, the inability to respond immediately and effectively to certain types of problems was universal. When Constable Denis LEBLANC and I suggested the formation of the Problem Ownership Support Team (POST) to deal with the identified issues, the Superintendent responsible for Downtown Division was interested. He invited us to attend a meeting of divisional supervisors to outline our proposal. This meeting resulted in LEBLANC and I being assigned to a divisional planning committee tasked with working out the finer details and bring forth recommendations. # Response: To effectively deal with this problem, we wanted to provide ownership members with a flexible, committed resource that would essentially serve to extend or enhance their good efforts. That resource had to be comprised of police officers (manpower) functioning in a team atmosphere; however, it had to operate within a very strict problem solving framework. This team had to be available to the ownership members when and where they needed it and could NOT become an entity unto itself! To be successful, this team had to be responsible to our divisional ownership members (ultimately to the community itself through these officers) and be focused upon community problems - not just crime! The first hurdle we had to clear was to expose the myth that various specialty units were already in existence, which were capable of filling this void. For instance, if the problem was drug houses, front line members could simply enlist the services of a Detective from Drug Control Unit to assist. If the problem was young offenders doing residential break and enters to homes, members could call up Surveillance Unit and have these people targeted, right? WRONG! The trouble was that these units worked citywide and were responsible to a host of other specialized units. Their priorities lie with those other areas such as Homicide Section, Armed Robbery Section or Serious Offenders Section. They do not deal in community problems, and nor do they have a vested interest in any specific division or community. They will commit to ownership members on the front line only in absence of other more pressing requests. While there is no denying that these types of units serve an important function within our organization, they are obviously not the answer to our problems at the front line level. What would be better is a team, built from within the division who are given the latitude to show tremendous flexibility to address problems. They would need to adjust shift days and times as necessary, be prepared to work in uniform or plain clothes depending upon the nature of the problem as well as provide all services necessary to render problems manageable for ownership officers. This would include covert surveillance, uniformed activities, execution of warrants, public presentations or any other activities which would contribute to the solution of an identified problem. Going back to the example of the youths doing break ins, the team could target these offenders using surveillance to catch them at their crimes. Once charged, specific conditions are suggested relative to interim release which, at the very least, serve to limit the offenders' ability to negatively impact a community. Conditions were included, such as the necessity to reside at a certain address, to be inside the residence after a certain hour, or to attend school. This serves to make a previously difficult problem very manageable for the ownership member. He or she can now simply drop by the offenders' address or even call by phone to ensure compliance with the conditions under which the offender is released. Another important feature of this solution is the fact that this team would not take problems over or away from ownership members. The problems remain the responsibility of that member and he or she would supplement the team for the duration of the project as coordinator. The team is responsible to the front line problem solvers and would not operate independently of them in their districts. From the outset of our deliberations, our primary concern was to ensure our response was implemented in such a way as to be compatible with the principles of community based policing. The Superintendent was clear from the beginning that he did not want a "crime busting" team, as this was reminiscent of a Professional Model response. We had to come up with appropriate checks and balances to ensure proper focus was maintained. We had to address what types of problems the team would help with, for whom, and how priorities would be established when there were multiple requests. Other issues studied by the planning committee included, how many members would comprise the team, what types of equipment would be required, how much would it cost, how would we monitor progress? Quite frankly, this initiative would not be expensive to implement. The main (and most expensive) aspect is manpower. Since the members were to come directly from Downtown Division, no new salaries needed to be paid and no new positions were created to refill the vacancies created in patrol. With respect to equipment, we recommended the purchase of four surveillance kits and one cellular telephone. No additional vehicles were required; however, maintenance and operating costs for the ones we did have would be charged back to the division. It was apparent from the start that the benefits of this initiative would far outweigh the modest start up and carrying costs. The divisional planning committee met to discuss the issues on September 26, 1996. The recommendations submitted included: # Team Mandate: The team will provide support for members of Downtown Division in relation to divisional community problems that require a team response. # Supervisor Selection Process: One Sergeant will be assigned responsibility as Team Supervisor. ## Number of Personnel on the Team: The team shall consist of 6 members (two from each of the three Platoons) plus the supervisor, and the team will be supplemented by members identifying the problem for the duration of the project. ## Length of Term on Team: The term of service on the team will be 6 months. ## Team Selection Process: The Administrative Staff Sergeant and the team Sergeant will select two members from each of the three Platoons. ## Team Critique: - Minimum 3 years service - Strong Team Player - Willing To Work A Variety of Assignments - Highly Motivated - Demonstrated Strong Commitment to Community Based Policing Philosophies ## Requests For Team Use: Request for the assistance of the team shall be made by submitting a Standard Operational Plan through the chain of command. The submitting member is to identify the problem and response considering the SARA model. The nature of the problem must be such that a team response is required. These recommendations were accepted as presented and the suggested time lines were followed to the day. Once candidates were selected the team formally began operations on November 04, 1996. With respect to difficulties encountered along the road to implementation of the POST Team, several issues come to mind. The main one was the need to clearly and properly communicate the intent of the team. Had we suggested the formation of a team designed to "solve crime", "take back the streets", "catch criminals" or any activity of that sort, we would have been shot down at the outset. The focus had to be upon problem solving using strategies that would serve to further the evolution of Community Based Policing in Edmonton and not set it back. We were able to satisfy this concern by making the team directly responsible to the communities through the assigned ownership members. We build in the expectation of flexibility designed to alleviate all the logistical problems we had previously encountered. These included hearing such things as, "we are not available on those days", "we can't get involved in that" or, at the last minute, "sorry, we can't make it"! The team was expected to involve itself in any suitable problem identified by ownership members. The possibilities were endless but the focus had to be maintained. The second biggest challenge we had to overcome was ensuring that the team was never viewed as "elitist", a "specialty unit" or separate from (above) the front line members. The ultimate success of the team, and indeed the ownership members themselves, was dependent upon their support and use of this resource. Even further, it was these officers who we would rely upon to not only utilize the team, but also to staff it through regular rotations. There was no room for animosity or division. # Assessment The initiation of the P.O.S.T. Team on November 04, 1996 was very much like the grand opening of a business for Denis LEBLANC and myself. The excitement we were feeling was tempered with the worried thought, "what if it doesn't catch on?" Evaluation was going to be immediate and ongoing, particularly among divisional squad sergeants and the staff sergeants commanding their platoons. They would be looking for the flexibility we had been touting and also results. Our main concern, at least early on, was motivating ownership members to put this team to work. This would be our initial measure of effectiveness as we felt usage was an indicator of acceptance. To our delight, lack of work was not a problem. This first request involved the investigation of 25 pawnshops suspected of accepting stolen property. The project resulted in 22 by-law charges and 3 criminal charges being laid against 11 pawn shop owners. This operation received considerable media attention and sent a strong message to businesses involved in the receipt of property. Ownership members embraced the concept of the POST Team as a resource. At the end of the first six months the team had been involved in 50 different projects regarding community problems ranging from break and enters, thefts of/from autos, prostitution, drug houses, to problems with city businesses and licensed premises. There were also operations carried out dealing with public intoxication and aggressive panhandlers in affluent areas of the city. As previously indicated, several communities within Downtown Division were extremely vocal about an increase in prostitution, drug houses, property and youth crime. With the POST Team up and running, ownership officers were putting forth plans to address these issues. In one community, a plan to deal with prostitutes involved a four night undercover operation. The undercover officers would "communicate" with the prostitutes who would be arrested. Rather than release them via appearance notice as had been done in the past, the prostitutes would be lodged in jail. An ownership member was assigned to conduct bail hearings in front of a Justice of the Peace and explain the negative impact the prostitutes were having upon his/her assigned community. Requests were made for bail conditions, which would preclude the prostitutes from being in the area. By the conclusion of this first operation, 53 prostitutes had been charged and removed from the neighborhood. This served to provide immediate relief to the residents while also making the problem much more manageable for the ownership officers. After this project, they were able to arrest numerous return prostitutes on sight for breaching their release conditions. Another operation regarding prostitution was expanded and conducted a month later. This one resulted in the arrest of 115 prostitutes. These strategies were even further expanded later to deal with the issue of "Johns" and their cruising. Undercover operations targeting "Johns" were conducted and supplemented by uniformed check stops aimed at reducing prostitution related cruising in these areas as well. It was a three-pronged effort designed to provide the community with relief from a serious problem that will probably never be completely eliminated. Drug houses in these neighborhoods were a problem that was very closely linked to the prostitution issue. Prior to POST, there had been many of these "outlets" operating brazenly in residential neighborhoods. "Raids" of these locations began, sometimes several in a night. The team utilized Tactical Unit to do initial entries where weapons were a concern or where the houses had been fortified by the traffickers inside. Persons responsible were arrested and, once again, area restrictions were imposed to exclude them from the neighborhoods where they were committing their crimes. We made sure warrant executions were highly visible to ensure that citizens knew the police were responding to the information they were providing to their beat or ownership officer. Some of the drug houses were easy to clean up, others were not! One group of offenders evolved to a point that they would only sell cocaine to "regulars" and would bring no more cocaine into a house than they could carry in their mouths. Drug house doors were fortified and people were posted at each entrance to watch for police. The traffickers knew that between the fortifications and early warning mechanisms they would have ample time to dispose of any modest amount of cocaine they had in their possession. This type of activity resulted in the ownership officers' becoming firmer in their resolve. On one operation, warrants were authorized to clone paging devices, monitor cellular and hard (phone) line transmissions and install tracking devices on vehicles. The operation involved the extensive use of civilian agents and informants as well as undercover operators were trading commodities such as cigarettes and liquor for stolen property and cocaine. At the conclusion of this operation 57 persons were arrested for drug and property offenses. This sustained commitment had tremendous impact as it removed serious offenders who had been widely regarded as "untouchable" by other drug traffickers and users. This brought about an end to brazen nature of these types of traffickers and the disrespect they had been showing for citizens in several communities. The successes that were attained in relation to drug houses and traffickers spilled over into the area of property crimes as well. The drug houses that had previously been operating were creating a huge market for all types of stolen property. Addicts were involved in break and enters, thefts from vehicles or even shoplifting to obtain cocaine. Team surveillance identified many offenders who were either arrested at the time or targeted for property crimes subsequently. It was the drug houses themselves that were localizing both prostitution and property crime within the communities. Once these houses were closed, problems associated to both prostitution and property crimes decreased in these areas significantly. While the initial measure of success had been simple team acceptance, it had become much more than that. The neighborhoods that had been complaining about police were beginning to notice the difference. This resulted in community organizations commending the ownership officers for their commitment to their communities. Although things were still not perfect they were significantly better than they had been. The ownership officers now had the resources to assist the communities with most any type of problem that came along. The evaluation statistics for this team significant The statistics provided at the 6month evaluation included the following (The full statistics for the years 1997 and 1998 have been included as Appendix If): - Projects Worked On: 50 - Arrests: literally hundreds (Over 200 for prostitution related offenses alone at that point) - Stolen Property Recovered: \$40,000 - Cash Seized - Proceeds of Crime: \$123,956 - Drug Seizures: Heroin - 2.7 oz. - Drug Seizures: Cocaine - 33 oz. - Drug Seizures: Marihuana - 5 Lbs. - Drug Seizures: Psylocybin - 7 oz. - Drug Seizures: Talwin \& Ritalin - 250 Sets - Firearms Seized: 4 One of the biggest highlights for the POST Team occurred on July 04, 1997. A robber who had been dubbed the "Lunch Box Bandit" plagued financial institutions within Downtown Division. Investigators believed he was using underground tunnels and, perhaps the Light Rail Transit System to make his escapes. The team was assigned to spread out throughout the downtown area and provide surveillance on as many banks as possible. If a robbery did occur, members would flood the area and in particular, the underground pedway system. On a Friday afternoon, the call came in from a bank at 100 Street and Jasper Avenue. Team members flooded the pedway system and were fortunate enough to spot a suspect. The suspect was arrested in the lobby of a hotel some distance from the scene with cash, a handgun, and a disguise in his possession. On the day the arrest was made, the team had come back to cover the bank robbery file at 0900 hours despite having finished the previous shift only five hours earlier ( 0400 hours). This again underscores the value of enhanced flexibility at the front line level. The implementation of the POST Team in Downtown Division served to further the evolution of community based policing by enhancing the important principle of ownership. The existence of the team aided directly in increasing job satisfaction for front line officers responsible for problem solving, while also having a significant impact upon systemic community problems such as prostitution, drug houses, property and youth crime. The team's ability to reduce crime and disorder while enhancing public safety in Edmonton is undisputed. Citizen's perceptions of their police were also positively affected even though most did not realize that such a team was at work in their neighborhoods. The citizens were still directly connected to their assigned ownership officers and it was this person whom they thanked for all the good work which is exactly as it was designed to be! # Appendix I ## AGENCY and OFFICER INFORMATION 1) The POST Team initiative was initially adopted at the front fine level by Downtown Division to serve the ownership officers working there. As a result of the communicated successes of the team, other patrol divisions recognized the benefits of such a resource as well. The initiative has now spread to the point that all four patrol divisions now either have a team operational, or are in the process of getting one started. 2) As mentioned earlier, the Edmonton Police Service was one of the first agencies in Canada to commit to a Community Based, Problem Oriented policing model. Our service delivery model changed in the mid-1980's and, since that time, our evolution within this model has been ongoing. Our new officers receive extensive instruction on Problem Solving during recruit training. Effective problem identification and solving is encouraged throughout all levels of the organization. 3) In Edmonton, police officers have their performance evaluated, at least in part, based upon their commitment to community based policing and problem solving. The implementation of the POST Team provided us with another means of rewarding those who choose to actively support these philosophies. Members recognized for their problem solving abilities and past work are selected to be members of the team. In addition, ownership officers are rewarded for undertaking problems requiring the Team's assistance by being able to participate in the project with the team and to serve as project coordinator. 4) No manuals or other such resources were used in the development or management of this initiative. 5) In the case of this problem, which was internal and resource based, it was not the normal problem considered in the context of SARA. As SARA was applied to it, there were no real problems identified that were attributable to the mode) itself. 6) The resources required to implement the POST Team did not extend far beyond the reallocation of existing manpower within the division. In this case, 6 constables and one sergeant were assigned on a full time basis to the team. Four surveillance kits were obtained from EPS stock and the portable radios to go along with them were already here as well. There were no vehicles purchased; however, expenses do get charged back to the division on a "user-pay" type basis. Even this can be offset somewhat when we consider that if the members were assigned to patrol, they would still be driving cars in their daily duties. The manpower was without a doubt the biggest expense and commitment. Office space somewhere very near the front line members was also required. None of this went beyond existing budgets. 7) Project Contact Person(s): Sergeant Denis LEBLANC Downtown Division Edmonton Police Service 9620 103A Avenue EDMONTON, Alberta T5H-0H7 Phone: (780)421-2344 Fax: (780)421-2207 E-Mail: N/A ## Thank You for Considering Our Submission: Sergeant. Denis LEBLANC Constable Mark NEUFELD Downtown Division Edmonton Police Service 9620 103A Avenue EDMONTON, Alberta T5H-0H7 Phone: (780)421-2813 Fax: (780)421-2207 E-Mail: N/A ![img-1.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/99-16/img-1.jpeg) # Appendix II ## PROBLEM OWNERSHIP SUPPORT TEAM STATISTICS $1997 \& 1998$ | Category | 1997 | 1998 | | :--: | :--: | :--: | | Arrests: | 602 | 399 | | Drug Charges | 364 | 522 | | Criminal Charges: | 442 | 189 | | Cocaine Seized | 40 Oz | 29 Oz. | | Marihuana Seized: | 16.9 Lbs. | 12.6 Lbs. | | Speed Seized: | 4.0 Gr. | 131.5 Gr. | | Hashish Seized: | 2.9 Oz | 3.5 Oz.. | | Warrants Executed | 181 | 175 | | Property Seized: | \$84,970 | \$64,400 | | Money Seized: | \$81,247 | \$141,227 | | Summonses \& By-Law: | 170 | 76 | | Firearms Seized: | 5 | 5 | | Impaired Drivers | 5 | 2 | | Drug Houses Investigated: | 59 | 36 | | City Businesses Investigated: | 21 | Not Kept | | Intelligence Reports Submitted: | 37 | Not Kept |