--- title: "Police and Citizens Encounter" type: "pdf" year: "2011" canonical: "/projects/819" --- # Summary The year 2010 was a tough year for the inner city neighborhoods of Miami. Part 1 crimes were on the increase in the communities of Model City, Little Haiti Overtown, Wynwood and Allapattah. The Miami Police Department (MPD) responded with an increased presence to mitigate the number of homicides and other violent crimes. Law enforcement personnel initiated an operation to reduce the number of weapons on the streets and improve the quality of life. In the midst of identifying the most dangerous persons in those areas, there were a number of police-involved shootings (seven by year's end), most resulting in the death of the subjects. Those shootings are currently being investigated by the Miami-Dade County State Attorney's office. In the meantime, police were confronted with an angry community who had no trust in the police department and its ability to keep the streets safe without engaging in more violence. To make matters worse, as answers were being demanded, the chief was precluded from making statements until the outcome of the investigations. There were protests and heated community meetings. Some religious, community and political leaders wanted someone to be held accountable. A SARA project was initiated to specifically bring the various segments of the community together who were seeking answers to the shootings and at the same time, wanted solutions to reducing the level of criminal activity in the neighborhoods. There was no one size fits all approach. This was a holistic initiative designed to enlist the help of all of the community stakeholders to achieve tangible benchmarks that everyone could embrace. The model was outlined by the executive assistant to the Chief of Police, majors, commanders and neighborhood resource officers in the affected patrol districts. Further, they engaged the assistance of the Major lan Moffett of the Training and Personnel Development Section and its training instructors. Together they designed a program that could educate the public and build a bridge to ease the tension, with the ultimate goal of diminishing problems plaguing the community. Additionally, in order for the program to be successful, police determined that engaging inner-city pastors in finding solutions and in addressing the needs of unemployed, under-educated residents worked to everyone's benefits. They also needed partners who had an established rapport to empathize with the dangers experienced by law enforcement and the risks involved when confronted with hostile and armed subjects. Thus the PACE initiative was created. # Table of Contents - [Summary](#summary) - [Description](#description) - [Scanning](#scanning) - [Analysis](#analysis) - [APPENDIX A](#appendix-a) - [City of Miami Police Department Homicide Unit Comparing Homicides, Hits, Miss 2009, 2010, 2011 by Net & District](#city-of-miami-police-department-homicide-unit-comparing-homicides-hits-miss-2009-2010-2011-by-net-district) - [Updated on 5/18/11](#updated-on-51811) - [Comparing Homicides by Net Areas & District 2009, 2010, 2011](#comparing-homicides-by-net-areas-district-2009-2010-2011) - [Comparing Hits by Net Areas & District 2009, 2010, 2011](#comparing-hits-by-net-areas-district-2009-2010-2011) - [Comparing Miss by Net Areas & District 2009, 2010, 2011](#comparing-miss-by-net-areas-district-2009-2010-2011) - [APPENDIX B](#appendix-b) - [MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT NEIGHBORHOOD RESOURCE](#miami-police-department-neighborhood-resource) - [PROJECT: NRO COMMUNITY SURVEY](#project-nro-community-survey) # Description ## Scanning The 2010 police shootings in the Overtown and Model City neighborhoods created some tense moments. The first man, DeCarlos Moore was killed in July following a traffic stop. Police said he reached into his car and they were in fear of their lives. The news coverage was intense. Residents were claiming he was shot in the back. He wasn't armed. The community wanted instant answers. Prior to any pronouncement of that shooting, the media was reporting that there had been another shooting by Miami Police, this time in Model City. In fact, there were three additional shootings in August alone. All of the deceased were young Black African-American males. Each time, residents demanded a plausible response from police. Why had these men been shot? Could any of this have been avoided? Were there renegade officers who were insensitive to residents? As the cry came louder and louder for more answers, people were met with a wall of silence. The chief of police was prohibited from publicly speaking prior to the completion of the investigation by the State Attorney office. In addition to the community uproar, the political stakeholders were also expressing concern, creating political dissension between the City leaders and the Chief, some of it spurred by the media. In examining the level of outrage, police officers in the Overtown community realized that there were serious problems and there was a disconnection between the residents and the department. Community meetings had become infrequent to nonexistent in some areas. Some quality of life issues were not being vigorously addressed. As a result, those living in the area were frustrated by the perceived harsh treatment at the hands of police. Overtown and Wynwood/Edgewater Commander Lazaro Ferro and his neighborhood resource officers, Melissa Stuckey and Leonard Kelly carefully reviewed data and attempted to assure the apprehensive residents that in time, there would be answers for all the queries and that law enforcement had every intention as much as possible to be responsive to their needs not combative. # Analysis Further analysis indicated that a more comprehensive strategy was needed and the solutions were not going to be quick and easy, but rather it was necessary for long range planning to re-establish a good working partnership in the area. One of the determinations that was made was that the shootings were symptomatic of a larger problem brewing in the inner-city areas. Unemployment was sky-rocketing, especially with convicted felons, who were returning to a life of crime to ease financial burdens. Additionally, many parents, especially single moms, were having a hard time managing their children on their own and protecting them from criminal activities. Equally important and of great significance to officers was that pastors, who at one time had been major stakeholders in these communities were no longer responsive either to police or the residents. Many of the pastors no longer related to the immediate community because their parishioners don't live immediately around the churches. Executive Assistant to the Chief of Police Alfredo Vega met with the Overtown commander and his team and began brainstorming about how to focus the proper resources on the issues needing confronting. One of the initial considerations was that the police shootings were not the problem, but rather the result of a populace who needed to be educated on the proper responses if approached by police. Moreover, the unsavory activities plaguing the neighborhoods would require all of the stakeholders to get involved. In fact, shootings were on the rise in both the neighborhoods of Overtown and Model City. In 2009, there were 14 homicides in Overtown and 16 in 2010; 31 hits in 2009 and 23 the following year as well as 21 misses in 2010 versus 6 from the previous year. In Model City, homicides increased to 15 from 10 last year, whereas hits dropped slightly in 2010 to 55 from 59. The number of misses rose dramatically in 2010 to 82 from less than 30 in 2009. During this phase of strategizing, pastors were invited to come to the Miami Police Department and meet with police to explore opportunities where residents could receive much needed social service assistance. The clergy persons were also asked to consider how to reduce the level of violence, particularly among youth and young adults. Finally, there were frank conversations about the perception of how police treat minorities, especially young men in the inner city. **RESPONSE** Shortly following the death of Decarlos Moore, the first approach to alleviating some of the concerns was to call a community meeting in which family members, City officials, other stakeholders and police would come together to discuss the circumstances that might have led up to the shooting. Law enforcement and other agency representatives were met with hostility from the community and specifically, they were un-accepting of the idea that it would be inappropriate for the Chief to speak on the specifics of the case. Any other discussion that was being contemplated that afternoon was quickly dismissed because the attendees were becoming a bit agitated. Family members were distressed at the response from city leaders and vowed to remain vigilant until they got satisfactory answers as to what happened that awful day. The executive assistant and the others understood from that meeting that a different type of response was needed if the community was ever to rally again to the side of the police. Before another plan could be etched, there was the killing of Joel Lee Johnson on August 11th, followed by the death of Gibson Belizaire in a shootout with police in the middle of Little Haiti on August 14th, immediately followed by the fatal shooting of Tarnorris Gaye on August 20th. These police-involved shootings were the culmination of the department's initiative, "Take Back Our Streets." More than 170 arrests were made during the five-day operation and 10 firearms were confiscated. In addition, 450 citations were written. As community leaders lead the drum beat for the chief's firing, command staff was equally vigilant in their quest for a solution to the overarching uptick of civilian violence in Overtown, Little Haiti and Model City. They returned to their original premise that the shootings were the point but not the root cause of the problem. Having said that, all agreed that education was part of the answer. They enlisted the assistance and guidance of Major Ian Moffett, Commander of the Training and Personnel Development Section. They navigated through the media coverage and the feedback being received from the field through the neighborhood resource officers as well as patrol officers. Each analysis brought them back to the need for an emphasis on educating the public. A determination was made that instruction should begin with clergy. After all, if they could be persuaded that police was not the enemy, pastors could become a big part of the solution. A curriculum was developed to guide religious leaders through the various processes that police are required to adhere to when patrolling the streets. Pastors and preachers were mandated to take the Ethics and Professionalism course that is required for all City of Miami employees. In fact City workers must repeat a similar course every three years. Beyond that, students received training in Racial Profiling and Professional Traffic Stops, Use of Force and Mental Preparation. When the preachers received a certificate of completion following a debriefing, they were permitted to ride-along with police officers in the field. The program in which clergy accompanied sworn personnel gave them a different perspective on what officers encounter on a daily basis. While everyday does not end in massive tragedy, safety is always a major concern for both officers and citizens alike. The training gave them a great overview of how police officers are prepared before they are released to work on their own. Initially, there was resistance to the program. Pastors were apprehensive about a police provided training program. Many of those same leaders were calling for the chief's ouster, after all. Police continued to talk to pastors in effort to persuade them to partner with the department to make lasting changes in the community with the ultimate goal of making the neighborhood safe for children and law abiding citizens. Reverend Carl Johnson, Pastor of the 93rd Street Community Baptist Church was the first to agree to work with police. He brought other colleagues along. There were approximately 25 in the initial eight-hour course. MNKOI 0000032498 Other stakeholders who became aware of the program wanted information as well. They too wanted instruction and a better understanding of the conditions and circumstances that can contribute to the loss of life at the hands of police. Officers surmised that the residents also needed to be better informed. Major Moffett and his team worked to develop a separate curriculum based on input from officers in the field. The track for the public and partnering agencies includes a 15-minute video, broken into six different segments. The entire program lasts 90 minutes and really engages the viewer. The segments are specifically designed to prepare residents for police encounters. There are several scenarios: - The Noisy Party - Local Noise ordinances - Underage drinking laws - How youths attitudes make a difference - The Traffic Stop - Traffic Regulations - Routine procedures for traffic violations - Racial profiling - How to contest a ticket - The Shoplifter - Shoplifting laws and penalties - Why it is important to be honest and cooperative - Local store issues and policies - The Drug Deal - Drug Deals - The concept of "accessory to a crime" - Closure - Conduct a formal feedback session with workshop participants - Distribute pre-printed surveys included in this kit - Collect surveys and return in postage-paid envelope provided. At the conclusion of the program, participants are advised of three simple rules to follow if stopped by police. They also reiterate the words that are contained in a pamphlet that was prepared by Allstate Insurance, the National Organization for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE). In the section "The Cardinal Rule," the advice reads, "The easiest way to avoid negative run-ins with law enforcement officials is to simply stay out of trouble. If you hang out with the wrong crowd, you increase your chances of being approached by officers in pursuit of those suspected of, or associated with, criminal activities. If confronted by law enforcement, approach the officer as you would a friend, not an enemy." While the classes are a pivotal part of the puzzle in the development of strong community relationships, police also assessed that other issues need to be addressed, including unemployment, especially among convicted felons. If that segment of the population can't find work, there is a great tendency to return to those anti-social behaviors that led them to incarceration in the first place. More importantly, violent crime is elevated, greatly reducing the quality of life for all. The director of Brothers of the Same Mind was solicited to help find meaningful employment for residents with criminal records. The organization has been functioning since 2006 and this is one of the primary goals of the agency. In exploring other opportunities for reducing violence in Overtown and Model City, other leaders were called in for advice and counsel. In collaboration with The Alternative Programs, Inc., the P.A.P.P. (Parents & Police, Preachers, Pupils) initiative was created. This project is designed to "coordinate the efforts of the Parents and Police, Preachers, Pupils in an attempt to address crimes committed by our youth within our communities." The goal of the program is to provide young people and their parents with the consequences of criminal behavior and to strongly encourage them to remain on a path of good citizenship. Counseling and mentoring are provided for the children and other resources are introduced to them as warranted. The trainings continue both at the Miami Police College and in venues in the targeted neighborhoods. As a follow-up, participants who have email receive updated crime reports, hot spots, and police actions electronically. There is a goal to initiate Face book pages and Twitter in the future. Community meetings will continue to be an important facet of the communications process. In a continuing effort to maintain high police visibility, foot patrols have been implemented during high crime peak hours. This affords residents an opportunity associate with officers in a non-threatening manner and to build relationships. This process involves training the community, selecting and training officers and creating specific beats within the violent crime areas. Pastors who have completed the PACE course will be teamed up with officers to walk in the neighborhoods as well. **Assessment** At the conclusion of each program, surveys are distributed to get immediate feedback from participants. In reviewing the assessments, opportunities to implement change have been identified. Some changes include: 1. Police should walk through the neighborhoods instead of staying in their vehicles, thus officers will have more opportunities to interact with the community. 2. Officers will be trained to be firm, but always professional 3. Racial profiling versus community involvement by police officers 4. Educate the community on all the processes i.e. shootings, complaints, Internal Affairs processes. Such training should be conducted by NET commanders and NROs. 5. Identify the best officers for the task. The problem solving effort is being assessed in a number of ways. After great apprehension in the beginning, pastors have become more receptive of the program. More than 60 clergy persons have taken part in the program and participated in a ride-along with officers. Many of them are beginning to develop their own mentoring programs to reach out to young people to break the cycle of violence that has gripped the Overtown community for decades. The pastor-program has been expanded to include other Miami neighborhoods. NROs will maintain contact with pastors and monitor the progress of the additional initiatives that have been created in various congregations. Many of the churches are the current sites for community meetings and training for residents. As further analysis of Part 1 crimes are studied, the program will continue to be assessed in 90 day cycles to ensure that every possible concern is addressed: - 30 days - Community meetings and surveys - 60 days - Implement revisions as necessary - 90 days - Capture all statistical data In Overtown, there is clearly an improvement in the relationship between police and residents. One of the assurances that has been given to training attendees is that they can provide information about criminal activity completely anonymously. In the past, tips were difficult to attain, making it extremely difficult to solve crimes. After greater interaction between police and residents, when there was a shooting in Overtown in which the victim was shot in the face after confronting an individual selling narcotics in front of his grandmother's house in March 2011, several days passed and no one provided information about the offender. Two community meetings were held in which residents were asked for assistance to help solve the case. On April $13^{\text {th }}$, a citizen called and provided key information that led to the arrest of the offender responsible for the shooting. The information was so instrumental that once the subject was detained by officers, they found a handgun in the defendant's right pocket. After a thorough investigation, he confessed to the crime. Moreover, there have been no additional police shootings since January 1, 2011. Here is a chart comparison of where we are today, which is well below $50 \%$ of last year (2010) and the year before (2009): | 2011 | Homicide - Net Area | | | :--: | :--: | :--: | | Net | $\#$ | Percentage | | MC | 11 | $33 \%$ | | LHAI | 6 | $18 \%$ | | UES | 1 | $3 \%$ | | ALL | 5 | $15 \%$ | | WYN | 0 | $0 \%$ | | OT | 3 | $9 \%$ | | DT | 1 | $3 \%$ | | FLG | 0 | $0 \%$ | | CG | 0 | $0 \%$ | | CW | 0 | $0 \%$ | | LHAV | 6 | $18 \%$ | Agency and officer information: Project Contact Person: Lazaro Ferro Commander - Overtown and Wynwood/Edgewater NET Miami Police Department 400 NW 2 Avenue Miami, FL 33128 305-603-6635 305-603- (fax) Lazaro.ferro@miami-police.org Key Team Members: Alfredo Vega Executive Assistant to the Chief of Police Miami Police Department 400 NW 2 Avenue Miami, FL 33128 305-603-6615 Alfredo.vega@miami-police.org Ian A. Moffett Commander Training and Personnel Development Section Miami Police Department 400 NW 2 Avenue Miami, FL 33128 305-603-6615 lan.moffett@miami-police.org Melissa Stuckey Neighborhood Resource Officer - Overtown Miami Police Department 400 NW 2 Avenue Miami, FL 33128 305-372-4550 305-372-4553 (fax) melissa.stuckey@miami-police.org Leonard Kelly Neighborhood Resource Officer - Overtown Miami Police Department 400 NW 2 Avenue Miami, FL 33128 305-372-4550 305-372-4553 (fax) leonard.kelly@miami-police.org Reverend Carl Johnson Pastor $93^{\text {rd }}$ Street Community Baptist Church 2330 NW 93rd Street Miami, FL 33147 305-836-0942 305-696-0300 (fax) bd93church@bellsouth.net # APPENDIX A ![img-0.jpeg](https://popdatasets.blob.core.windows.net/popdatasetmdimgs/11-49/img-0.jpeg) # City of Miami Police Department Homicide Unit Comparing Homicides, Hits, Miss 2009, 2010, 2011 by Net & District ## Updated on 5/18/11 # Comparing Homicides by Net Areas & District 2009, 2010, 2011 | 2009 Homicide - District | | | | --- | --- | --- | | District | # | Percentage | | North | 22 | 33% | | Central | 31 | 47% | | South | 13 | 20% | | 2009 Homicides - Net Area | | | | --- | --- | --- | | Net | # | Percentage | | MC | 10 | 15% | | LHAI | 10 | 15% | | UES | 2 | 3% | | ALL | 8 | 12% | | WYN | 6 | 9% | | OT | 14 | 21% | | DT | 3 | 5% | | FLG | 3 | 5% | | CG | 0 | 0% | | CW | 7 | 11% | | LHAV | 3 | 5% | | 2010 Homicide - District | | | | --- | --- | --- | | District | # | Percentage | | North | 31 | 42% | | Central | 27 | 37% | | South | 15 | 21% | | 2010 Homicide - Net Area | | | | --- | --- | --- | | Net | # | Percentage | | MC | 15 | 21% | | LHAI | 14 | 19% | | UES | 2 | 3% | | ALL | 5 | 7% | | WYN | 3 | 4% | | OT | 16 | 22% | | DT | 3 | 4% | | FLG | 3 | 4% | | CG | 1 | 1% | | CW | 2 | 3% | | LHAV | 9 | 12% | | 2011 Homicide - District | | | | --- | --- | --- | | District | # | Percentage | | North | 18 | 55% | | Central | 9 | 27% | | South | 6 | 18% | | 2011 Homicide - Net Area | | | | --- | --- | --- | | Net | # | Percentage | | MC | 11 | 33% | | LHAI | 6 | 18% | | UES | 1 | 3% | | ALL | 5 | 15% | | WYN | 0 | 0% | | OT | 3 | 9% | | DT | 1 | 3% | | FLG | 0 | 0% | | CG | 0 | 0% | | CW | 0 | 0% | | LHAV | 6 | 18% | | 2010: 73 Murders in total | | | | --- | --- | --- | | 2011: 33 Murders so far | | | # Comparing Hits by Net Areas & District 2009, 2010, 2011 | 2009 Hits - District | | | | 2010 Hits - District | | | | 2011 Hits - District | | | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | District | # | Percentage | | District | # | Percentage | | District | # | Percentage | | North | 96 | 57% | | North | 95 | 58% | | North | 37 | 61% | | Central | 62 | 37% | | Central | 61 | 37% | | Central | 19 | 31% | | South | 10 | 6% | | South | 8 | 5% | | South | 5 | 8% | | 2009 Hits - Net Area | | | | 2010 Hits - Net Area | | | | 2011 Hits - Net Area | | | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Net | # | Percentage | | Net | # | Percentage | | Net | # | Percentage | | MC | 59 | 35% | | MC | 55 | 34% | | MC | 23 | 38% | | LHAI | 32 | 19% | | LHAI | 36 | 22% | | LHAI | 14 | 23% | | UES | 5 | 3% | | UES | 4 | 2% | | UES | 0 | 0% | | ALL | 21 | 13% | | ALL | 22 | 13% | | ALL | 2 | 3% | | WYN | 3 | 2% | | WYN | 8 | 5% | | WYN | 2 | 3% | | OT | 31 | 18% | | OT | 23 | 14% | | OT | 13 | 21% | | DT | 7 | 4% | | DT | 8 | 5% | | DT | 2 | 3% | | FLG | 2 | 1% | | FLG | 2 | 1% | | FLG | 0 | 0% | | CG | 1 | 1% | | CG | 3 | 2% | | CG | 2 | 3% | | CW | 3 | 2% | | CW | 1 | 1% | | CW | 0 | 0% | | LHAV | 4 | 2% | | LHAV | 2 | 1% | | LHAV | 3 | 5% | **2009: 168 Hits in total** **2010: 164 Hits in total** **2011: 61 Hits so far** # Comparing Miss by Net Areas & District 2009, 2010, 2011 | 2009 Miss - District | | | | --- | --- | --- | | District | # | Percentage | | North | 60 | 59% | | Central | 25 | 25% | | South | 16 | 16% | | 2009 Miss - Net Area | | | | --- | --- | --- | | Net | # | Percentage | | MC | 29 | 29% | | LHAI | 25 | 25% | | UES | 6 | 6% | | ALL | 11 | 11% | | WYN | 7 | 7% | | OT | 6 | 6% | | DT | 1 | 1% | | FLG | 8 | 8% | | CG | 1 | 1% | | CW | 1 | 1% | | LHAV | 6 | 6% | | 2010 Miss - District | | | | --- | --- | --- | | District | # | Percentage | | North | 117 | 63% | | Central | 50 | 27% | | South | 18 | 10% | | 2010 Miss - Net Area | | | | --- | --- | --- | | Net | # | Percentage | | MC | 82 | 44% | | LHAI | 30 | 16% | | UES | 5 | 3% | | ALL | 11 | 6% | | WYN | 16 | 9% | | OT | 21 | 11% | | DT | 2 | 1% | | FLG | 2 | 1% | | CG | 2 | 1% | | CW | 7 | 4% | | LHAV | 7 | 4% | | 2011 Miss - District | | | | --- | --- | --- | | District | # | Percentage | | North | 30 | 52% | | Central | 15 | 26% | | South | 13 | 2% | | 2011 Miss - Net Area | | | | --- | --- | --- | | Net | # | Percentage | | MC | 23 | 40% | | LHAI | 7 | 12% | | UES | 0 | 0% | | ALL | 5 | 9% | | WYN | 10 | 17% | | OT | 0 | 0% | | DT | 0 | 0% | | FLG | 0 | 0% | | CG | 3 | 5% | | CW | 2 | 3% | | LHAV | 8 | 14% | 2009 : 101 Miss in total 2010 : 185Miss in total 2011 : 58 Miss so far # APPENDIX B # MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT NEIGHBORHOOD RESOURCE ## PROJECT: NRO COMMUNITY SURVEY PLEASE ANSWER EVERY QUESTION 1. I OFTEN AVOID GOING OUT DURING THE DAYTIME BECAUSE I AM AFRAID OF CRIME. 2. FEAR OF CRIME IS VERY HIGH IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD. 3. THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT I WILL BE THE VICTIM OF A PROPERTY CRIME (THEFT, BURGLARY, ETC.) IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD THIS YEAR. 4. THE POLICE DEPARTMENT DOES THE BEST JOB IT CAN AGAINST CRIME IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD. 5. I FEEL THAT THERE IS A DRUG PROBLEM IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD. 6. THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT I WILL BE THE VICTIM OF A CRIME AGAINST MY PERSON (RAPE, MUGGING, ASSAULT, ETC.) IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD. 7. MY FEAR OF CRIME IS VERY HIGH. 8. I AM MORE AFRAID OF CRIME THAN I EVER HAVE BEEN. 9. I OFTEN AVOID GOING OUT AFTER DARK BECAUSE I AM AFRAID OF CRIME. 10. THE POLICE DEPARTMENT DOES THE BEST JOB IT CAN TO MAKE ME FEEL SAFE IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD. AGE: $\qquad$ SEX: $\qquad$ RACE: $\qquad$ YEARS IN NEIGHBORHOOD: $\qquad$ TYPE OF PROPERTY: $\qquad$ NAME: $\qquad$ DATE: $\qquad$ A-APARTMENT B-BUSINESS C-CONDOMINIUM D-INDIVIDUAL E-BOWITOWN HOME ADDRESS: $\qquad$ OR AREA $\qquad$ (Optional) NUMBER OF RESIDENTS IN HOUSEHOLD: $\qquad$ PREVIOUSLY FILLED OUT: $\qquad$